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ARTICLES
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM IN THE LOWER COURTS
Thomas P. Schmidt*
Debate about the virtues and vices of “judicial minimalism” is
evergreen. But as is often the case in public law, that debate so far has
centered on the Supreme Court. Minimalism arose and has been
defended as a theory about how Justices should judge. This Article
considers judicial minimalism as an approach for lower courts, which
have become conspicuous and powerful actors on the public law scene.
It begins by offering a framework that disentangles the three basic
meanings of the term “judicial minimalism”: decisional minimalism,
which counsels judges to decide cases on narrow and shallow grounds;
prudential minimalism, which counsels judges to avail themselves of
various techniques of not deciding cases (the so-called “passive
virtues”) on grounds of prudence; and Thayerian minimalism, which
counsels judges to refrain from invalidating the actions of the political
branches except in cases of clear illegality. This Article then argues
that several institutional features of lower courts make judicial
minimalism in most of its forms a particularly compelling ideal for
lower court judges. Further, attending to the differences between the
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lower courts and the Supreme Court reveals that minimalism is in
tension with the institutional logic of the Supreme Court. In all, this
Article aims both to clarify the concept of minimalism and to place it in
its proper institutional home. After making the case for lower court
minimalism, this Article proposes some strategies for realizing it: first,
developing a concept of judicial role fidelity that is tailored to the
institutional realities of lower courts, and second, reforming caseassignment rules, nationwide injunctions, and the size of the federal
bench to help channel lower courts toward more minimalist outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
The lower federal courts are active and conspicuous these days.
“[I]nferior” Article III courts (as the Constitution calls them1) have “now
assumed enormous legal, political, and cultural significance.”2 They have
repeatedly reviewed and halted major initiatives of the Trump and Biden
Administrations,3 often generating front-page headlines and issuing
decisive nationwide relief that reshapes American life.4 In the process,
they have decided—at least provisionally—major questions roiling the
nation, involving everything from abortion to race, religious freedom,
public health, immigration, and presidential power. It is an opportune time
to reflect on the proper role of a lower court judge in a public law case.
One of the most prominent theories addressing that general issue—the
proper role of a judge—goes by the label “judicial minimalism.”
Minimalism seems to be everywhere: it is deployed in court opinions,5
1

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has To
Teach Us, 69 Duke L.J. 1, 32 (2019). The present salience of lower federal courts may not be
historically unprecedented. One thinks, for instance, of the lower courts as a focal point in the
fight over federalism in the early Republic, Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of
American Federalism 179 (2010); of lower court enforcement of the fugitive slave laws,
Robert Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 159–74 (1975); or of
lower courts issuing injunctions against organized labor in the Progressive Era, William E.
Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1148–65
(1989).
3
See Bert I. Huang, Judicial Credibility, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1053, 1060 (2020) (noting
that the Trump era was “a political moment when numerous government actions [were] being
blocked by the lower federal courts”); Fred Barbash, Deanna Paul, Brittany Renee Mayes &
Danielle Rindler, Federal Courts Have Ruled Against Trump Administration Policies at Least
70 Times, Wash. Post (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphi
cs/2019/politics/trump-overruled/ [https://perma.cc/MR8E-WMTX] (“All administrations
lose cases, but experts cannot recall so many losses in such a short time.”); Ian Millhiser, Just
How Much Is Trump’s Judiciary Sabotaging the Biden Presidency?, Vox (Dec. 27, 2021) (on
file with editors), https://www.vox.com/22820378/trump-biden-supreme-court-judiciarysabotage.
4
E.g., Michael D. Shear, Stacy Cowley & Alan Rappeport, Biden’s Efforts at Race Equity
Run into Snags, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2021, at A1; Alexander Burns, Federal Judge Blocks
New Ban on Travel to U.S., N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2017, at A1. I represented the plaintiffs in
the second of these cases, culminating in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). The views
expressed in this Article are my own.
5
See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (ruling on narrow,
case-specific grounds); id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring) (defending this narrow
disposition); id. at 1887–88 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority’s
narrow disposition). I represented the City of Philadelphia in the Supreme Court in Fulton.
Again, the positions taken here are mine.
2
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theorized in the legal academy,6 and debated in the commentariat.7 It is a
“dominant school of thought” today, with deep roots in our legal culture.8
Eminences like James Bradley Thayer, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Alexander Bickel, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Cass Sunstein, to name only
a few, have embraced variants of minimalism.9
To date, however, debates about lower court judging and debates about
minimalism have rarely intersected. The bulging literature on judicial
minimalism has focused on the Supreme Court of the United States.
Minimalism developed and has been offered as a philosophy for Justices,
not judges. As far as I am aware, no one has systematically considered
whether judicial minimalism makes sense as a model for lower court
judges, who handle the vast bulk of Article III adjudication.10
This Article takes up that question and answers yes: the institutional
situation of lower courts makes judicial minimalism in most of its forms
a particularly compelling model for a lower court judge. Substantiating
that claim requires a few steps. The first is to define what judicial
minimalism is and unpack why it has been defended, and so this Article
begins by offering a framework that disentangles the three core meanings
of judicial minimalism. Next, this Article walks through the institutional

6

See infra Part I.
E.g., David Cole, Surprising Consensus at the Supreme Court, N.Y. Rev. of Books (July
7, 2021), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2021/08/19/surprising-consensus-at-the-supreme
-court/ [https://perma.cc/2VZH-9GDU] (discussing “minimalism” in the Supreme Court’s
recently concluded Term); Jay Michaelson, Your Father’s Supreme Court, Intelligencer, N.Y.
Mag. (July 3, 2021) (on file with editors), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/07/yourfathers-supreme-court.html (same).
8
Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial
Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1753, 1776 (2004); Neal Devins,
Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, and the Consequences
of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 935, 938–39 (2016)
(“Minimalism remains vibrant and is almost certainly the most important contemporary
constitutional theory that formally takes into account the dynamic between the Supreme Court
and elected government.”).
9
See infra Part I.
10
See Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the
Supreme Court, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 91, 93 (2006) (noting that “the eighty cases that the
Supreme Court hears annually represent the small tip of a vast iceberg” and that “most
determinative legal interpretations occur instead in the federal courts of appeals, in the state
supreme courts, and in state appellate courts”); Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted
Plants: Inferior Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 843,
844 (1993) (“The behavior of the roughly 100 circuit judges and 500 district judges is, for
most citizens most of the time, far more likely to count as ‘the law’ than the pronouncements
of the nine denizens of the Supreme Court . . . .”).
7
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features of lower courts that distinguish them from the Supreme Court
and explores how those features bear upon the judicial role. I argue that,
taken together, those features counsel in favor of an approach to judging
that coincides closely with the program of judicial minimalism. The call
for institutional “situation-sense” that motivates this Article yields more
than just a prescription for lower courts. Attending to the full context of
the judicial system calls into question judicial minimalism as an ideal for
the Supreme Court—the institution it was designed to address. Finally,
the Article closes with some proposed reforms to cultivate a measure of
minimalism in the lower courts. In a word, I aim to give the concept of
judicial minimalism more analytical precision and to place it in its proper
institutional home.
Such a project seems timely. As noted, lower courts have become
highly visible and powerful actors on the public law scene.11 They are, as
a result, starting more and more to attract the notice of theorists and
commentators.12 This attention is welcome. The traditional (if often
implicit) focus of public law scholarship has been the Supreme Court, and
the lower courts, as a result, were often overlooked.13 In recent years,
though, scholars have paid increasing heed to the variety of institutions
that consider and decide questions of public law.14 The core contention of
this “institutional turn” is that normative theory about legal decision
making ought to be bespoke, tailored to the manifold institutional settings
11

See supra note 2.
See, e.g., Perry Bacon Jr., The Most Dangerous Conservative Judges Aren’t on the
Supreme Court, Wash. Post (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/20
21/12/21/most-dangerous-conservative-judges-arent-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/J4KJVZTH].
13
See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 679, 681 (1999) (“Our excessive
focus on the Supreme Court . . . has over the years minimized and obscured large areas of
American experience . . . .”); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The ForwardLooking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1994) (“[W]hile
numerous scholars have comprehensively explored the nature and function of judicial law
declaration from the perspective of the Supreme Court or a hypothetical single-judge judiciary,
few have considered the view from below and the interaction between subordinacy and
function.”).
14
See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L.
Rev. 885, 920–22 (2003). Of course, at a high level of generality, legal scholarship had been
preoccupied with institutional questions since at least the legal process school, see Edward L.
Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1396 (1996), but Professors Sunstein and Vermeule
called for a more rigorously empirical and less stylized approach to institutional analysis.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra, at 897–913.
12
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in which questions of public law are resolved.15 The study of lower courts
has been a beneficiary of this institutional turn: recent scholarship has
examined originalism,16 popular constitutionalism,17 statutory
interpretation,18 stare decisis,19 foreign law,20 Chevron deference,21 and
other topics in the context of lower federal courts,22 to say nothing of state
courts.23 This scholarship has usefully foregrounded the judicial bodies
that decide many multiples more cases than the ever-vanishing sliver that
makes its way to the Supreme Court.24 But the void regarding judicial
15

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 886.
See Ryan C. Williams, Lower Court Originalism, 45 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 257 (2022).
17
Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 Yale L.J. Online 197, 215–18
(2013).
18
James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation in the Courts of
Appeals, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 681, 686 (2017); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and
Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 470–84
(2012).
19
Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 317, 318 (2005).
20
Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 Fordham L. Rev.
647, 656–64 (2008).
21
Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 777,
799–820 (2017) (arguing that the “major questions” exception to Chevron deference should
not be applied in lower courts).
22
Z. Payvand Ahdout, Enforcement Lawmaking and Judicial Review, 135 Harv. L. Rev.
937, 960–73 (2022) (evaluating lower courts’ use of case management techniques in recent
separation-of-powers suits); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from
Below, 104 Geo. L.J. 921, 925 (2016) (arguing that lower courts can legitimately “narrow”
Supreme Court precedent in certain circumstances); Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court
Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 Am. U. L.
Rev. 457, 506–09 (2012) (viewing lower court decision making through the lens of complexity
theory). For a critique of the federal courts of appeals as they currently operate that blends
historical, empirical, and normative strands, see generally William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis (2013).
23
See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L. Rev.
2047, 2064–86 (2011) (exploring how judicial elections for state courts relate to theories of
popular constitutionalism); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”:
Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1842–76 (2001) (offering a
comprehensive survey of justiciability doctrines in state courts); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 166 (1984) (exploring the
relationship between constitutional theory and “the world of the state courts”).
24
In the 2020 Term, the Supreme Court issued only fifty-seven decisions in argued cases
(and sixty-seven decisions including summary reversals and orders on the shadow docket).
Stat Pack for the Supreme Court’s 2020–21 Term, SCOTUSBlog, https://www.scotusblog.co
m/statistics [https://perma.cc/SUY9-X5RD] (last visited May 20, 2022). The federal courts of
appeals decide nearly fifty thousand cases per year. Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Table B:
U.S. Courts of Appeals––Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month
Periods Ending September 30, 2019 and 2020, at 1 (Sept. 30, 2020),
16

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Judicial Minimalism in the Lower Courts

835

minimalism persists. And, in some ways, minimalism is even more
fundamental than these other questions because it goes to the basic
attitude a judge should have toward the task of adjudication and so is
interwoven with all the first-order interpretive debates just noted.25
Judicial minimalism also relates to larger public controversies
unfolding now about whether the federal judiciary should be reorganized
or limited. Many feel that the judiciary is out of step with the political and
legal mainstream.26 Prominent academics have called for major court
reforms.27 President Biden appointed a commission to explore, among
other things, changing the size of the Supreme Court—a proposal that
would have been nearly unthinkable not long ago.28 Other scholars have
objected to the increasingly prevalent “nationwide” injunction.29 Still
others have criticized the federal courts for insulating certain forms of
structural inequality in American society and have called for a
reorientation of public law scholarship toward “institutional reform and
democratic action.”30 Many of these proposals borrow overtly or
implicitly from theories of judicial minimalism—for instance,
institutionalizing a norm of deference to the political branches through
supermajority voting requirements or limiting courts’ jurisdiction and

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b_0930.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7M2-ESJB].
25
See infra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
26
See Jonathan S. Gould & David E. Pozen, Structural Biases in Structural Constitutional
Law, 97 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (manuscript at 20) (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3797051 [https://perma.cc/56BE-6CKF] (noting the
pro-Republican structural biases in our method for selecting judges); Joshua P. Zoffer & David
Singh Grewal, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty of a Minoritarian Judiciary, 11 Calif. L.
Rev. Online 437, 454–62 (2020) (documenting the rise of federal judges appointed by
Presidents and Senators representing a minority of the populace and the resulting legitimacy
crisis in the federal judiciary).
27
See generally Presidential Comm’n on the Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Final Report (2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/SCOTUS-Report-Final-12.8.21-1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/K69J-T2C8] (summarizing and assessing potential Supreme Court
reforms).
28
Michael D. Shear & Carl Hulse, Biden Orders Panel’s Review on Expanding Supreme
Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2021, at A13; cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation
of Powers, 124 Yale L.J. 2, 34 (2014) (“ ‘ Court packing’ is especially out of bounds.”).
29
E.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
Harv. L. Rev. 417, 457–65 (2017).
30
Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynksi & K. Sabeel Rahman,
Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century
Synthesis, 129 Yale L.J. 1784, 1807, 1829 (2020).
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remedial powers.31 More broadly, these controversies about the judicial
power confirm the growing need for public law theorists to grapple with
lower courts, who define, as a practical matter, the meaning of federal law
for so many people.32
This Article has three Parts. Judicial minimalism is a woolly concept
that is often invoked to mean different and even contradictory things. Part
I offers a novel typology of judicial minimalisms to set the analytical table
for the rest of the discussion. As a preview, judicial minimalism has three
core senses: first, decisional minimalism, associated most closely with
Professor Cass Sunstein,33 which counsels judges to decide cases on
narrow and shallow grounds; second, prudential minimalism, associated
most closely with Professor Alexander Bickel,34 which counsels judges to
avail themselves of various techniques of not deciding cases (the so-called
“passive virtues”) on grounds of prudence; and third, Thayerian
minimalism, associated originally with Professor James Bradley
Thayer,35 which counsels judges to refrain from invalidating the actions
of the political branches except in cases of clear illegality. My focus in
this Article is decisional minimalism, but I define the other two forms and
consider their applications in lower courts too.
31

See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109
Calif. L. Rev. 1703, 1727 (2021) (proposing that a supermajority of Justices be required to
strike down federal legislation); Howard M. Wasserman, Congress and Universal Injunctions,
2021 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 187, 192–201 (discussing various proposals to reform
nationwide or “universal” injunctions in Congress); cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, Constitutional Law
101: A Primer for the Law and Political Economy Blog, LPE Project (Nov. 23, 2018),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/constitutional-law-101-a-primer-for-the-law-and-political-econom
y-blog-3/ [https://perma.cc/UK7N-BSVU] (“[V]iewed from a political economic lens, the
battle for inclusion may sometimes involve judicial intervention, and other times involve
judicial minimalism.”).
32
See supra notes 10, 24. Indeed, it is even possible that lower court reform could achieve
some of the same ends as “packing” the Supreme Court. See McNollgast, Politics and the
Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631,
1634 (1995) (“[U]nder the appropriate circumstances, expansion of the lower judiciary can
have the same effect on judicial doctrine as packing the Supreme Court.”).
33
Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 3–6
(1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, One Case at a Time]; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 6–10 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things
Undecided].
34
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 111–98 (1962) [hereinafter Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch]; Alexander M. Bickel,
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 47–51 (1961) [hereinafter Bickel, Passive
Virtues].
35
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893).
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Equipped with this taxonomy, Part II surveys several key institutional
features of lower federal courts that distinguish them from the Supreme
Court and evaluates how these features might affect the proper judicial
role.36 The variables include docket size and judicial workload, the
operative rules of stare decisis, the assignment of judges, the methods of
case selection, and the processes of judicial appointment. I argue that the
differences between lower courts and the Supreme Court along these lines
make judicial minimalism in most of its forms a more compelling ideal in
the lower courts.37 The differences also reveal that decisional minimalism
is in deep tension with the institutional logic of the Supreme Court in its
present form. The Court’s near-total control over its agenda, its own stated
criteria for granting certiorari, its limited case load, and its structural role
as a superintendent of federal law through rare and episodic interventions

36
This Article is confined to the federal district courts and courts of appeals. There is much
greater institutional variety among state courts than there is among lower federal courts, and
that variety would have to inform any analysis of minimalism in those venues. Judicial
elections, in particular, would affect the democracy-based justifications for minimalism. See
Pozen, supra note 23, at 2052 (“Elected judges . . . might claim a special license to incorporate
public opinion into their decisional process, to engage in majoritarian review.”); Pamela K.
Bookman & Colleen F. Shanahan, A Tale of Two Civil Procedures, 122 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 5–14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=4016573 [https://perma.cc/WWC6-P82S] (laying out similarities and differences
between state and federal courts). Nor will I discuss minimalism for so-called “Article I”
judges or administrative agencies. See Laura K. Donohue & Jeremy McCabe, Federal Courts:
Art. III(1), Art. I(8), Art. IV(3)(2), Art. II(2)/I(8)(3), and Art. II(1) Adjudication, 71 Cath. U.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3–5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id=3825670 [https://perma.cc/4ZVH-XHJY] (discussing the full range of
congressionally created courts); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Geo. L.J. 53, 56–77 (2011) (discussing a
form of “minimalism” in agency policymaking).
37
My focus is public law cases, particularly constitutional and administrative law. See
Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Introduction: The Distinction Between Private Law
and Public Law, in Research Handbook on Private Law Theory 1, 3 (Benjamin C. Zipursky
& Hanoch Dagan eds., 2020). Private law in lower federal courts is complicated by Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and the frequent primacy of state law. See 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
That said, decisional minimalism is a framework that is potentially applicable in any case, and
this Article may very well have implications for federalized areas of private law like
intellectual property, antitrust, or labor law. Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic
Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1543, 1564–67
(2010) (defending a minimalist approach to intellectual property disputes). But my normative
prescriptions will probably have the most bite in prominent public law cases because that is
where non-minimalist decisions will be rewarded most in our current partisan ecosystem. See
infra notes 42, 375.
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all make the modern Court, in an important sense, an inherently antiminimalist institution.38
Part III considers how judicial minimalism might be inculcated in
lower courts. I begin with the need to develop a distinctive concept of role
fidelity for lower court judges fitted to their institutional situation. “Role
fidelity” refers to the ways that a judge’s socially conditioned
understanding of her role affects the way she fulfills that role.39 One
consequence of the Supreme Court fixation of so much public law
scholarship (and pedagogy) is that it tends to flatten concepts of judicial
role fidelity.40 A lower court judge is implicitly encouraged to act like a
mini-Justice. But ideals of judicial craft should not be flat.41 And an
important element of “role fidelity” for a lower court judge—that can be
given life through doctrine, commentary, and the appointment process—
is judicial minimalism.
Urging judges to be more minimalist is unlikely to be enough, however,
because the current political climate and structure of the lower federal
judiciary at times enable and even incentivize non-minimalist behavior
by motivated judges.42 As a result, some structural reform is also
38
See Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v Frederick, 2007
Sup. Ct. Rev. 205, 207–08 (criticizing decisional minimalism for undermining the Court’s
“guidance function” in light of its limited case load); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case
for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009) (arguing that minimalism is in tension
with the Constitution, which makes the Supreme Court “supreme” in defining the content of
federal law). On the Supreme Court’s extensive powers of agenda control, see Henry Paul
Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 Colum. L.
Rev. 665, 683–711 (2012).
39
The concept of judicial “role fidelity” was pioneered by Professor Robert Cover in his
study of anti-slavery judges before the Civil War. See Cover, supra note 2, at 7, 192–93; see
also Pozen, supra note 23, at 2084 (defining “role fidelity”).
40
See Barrett, supra note 19, at 352 (“We tend to take a one-size-fits-all approach to federal
court decision-making, assuming that the same interpretive practices should apply throughout
the federal courts.”).
41
Pozen, supra note 23, at 2084 (noting the view that “there is no global ideal of judicial
craft that exists independent of judicial structure”); Coenen & Davis, supra note 21, at 783
(arguing in favor of “assigning to different types of federal courts differentiated approaches to
reviewing government action”) (italicization omitted).
42
Professor Suzanna Sherry has observed that Supreme Court Justices increasingly seem to
“seek[] the approval of [their] own ideologically-polarized in-group” and that “[j]udicial
polarization becomes a larger problem when coupled with the modern trend of declining
institutional loyalty.” Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It), 106 Iowa
L. Rev. 181, 191–92 (2020). Some recent instances of lower court maximalism suggest that
similar forces may be seeping into all levels of the federal judiciary. Cf. Neal Devins & Allison
Orr Larsen, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1373, 1437 (2021) (documenting a
“dramatic spike in partisan en banc decision-making” in the courts of appeals and suggesting
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important. I suggest reforming case-assignment rules, requiring the
concurrence of more than one judge for nationwide injunctions, and, for
reasons that are not entirely intuitive but that I will explain below,
expanding the size of the federal bench. This may sound like an ambitious
program. But, given that structural reform of the judiciary is on the table
right now in a way that it has not been for generations, there is reason to
be hopeful.
I. THREE CONCEPTS OF MINIMALISM
The word minimalism is a coat of many colors.43 In this Part, I
anatomize it into its three basic senses in legal theory—decisional,
prudential, and Thayerian. At the outset, it may be useful to classify these
minimalisms in terms of what they minimize. Decisional minimalism—
the narrow and shallow disposition of cases—minimizes the scope and
impact of judicial opinions and so minimizes the sum total of decision
costs and error costs as well as judicial interference with the political
branches.44 Prudential minimalism—what Bickel called the passive

that there “are significant red flags to indicate that longstanding rule-of-law and collegiality
norms on the federal bench are eroding”). One virtue of lower court minimalism is that it
insists on a kind of judicial craft and humility that could resist the encroachments of
polarization in the lower federal judiciary. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and
the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 615, 631 (2000)
(suggesting that, at least twenty years ago, “prose and craft” might have been more important
“determinants of reputation” for lower court judges than substantive outcomes, in contrast to
Supreme Court Justices).
43
The literature on judicial minimalism is vast. For some prominent works beyond the
Sunstein-Bickel-Thayer canon, see generally Jamal Greene, Maximinimalism, 38 Cardozo L.
Rev. 623 (2016); Devins, supra note 8; Tara Smith, Reckless Caution: The Perils of Judicial
Minimalism, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 347 (2010); Grove, supra note 38; Schauer, supra note
38; Christopher J. Peters & Neal Devins, Alexander Bickel and the New Judicial Minimalism,
in The Judiciary and American Democracy: Alexander Bickel, the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, and Contemporary Constitutional Theory 45 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R.
Castillo eds., 2005); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial
Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951 (2005); Molot, supra note 8;
Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and
Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1411 (2002); Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the
Minimalist, 89 Geo. L.J. 2297 (2001); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial
Minimalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1454 (2000); Michael J. Perry, Constitution, the Courts, and
the Question of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 84 (1993).
44
As I will explain below, one could also understand decisional minimalism as minimizing
“jurispathy,” in Professor Robert Cover’s sense. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40 (1983); Greene, supra note 43, at 647 (linking minimalism
with the avoidance of “jurispathic” court decisions).
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virtues—minimizes the occasions for judicial involvement in the first
place. Finally, Thayerian minimalism minimizes the instances in which
judges invalidate the work of the political branches.
These minimalisms also aim ideally to generate different forms of
deliberation and dialogue in the wider political system.45 Decisional
minimalism will generally leave space for dialogue in the political
branches while also recognizing that certain narrow and shallow
interventions can improve the quality of public deliberation. Prudential
minimalism is sensitive to the fact that premature (or sometimes any)
judicial engagement can thwart political dialogue that might either (1)
ready the nation for a principled judicial ruling or (2) produce information
to improve judicial decision making. And Thayerian minimalism favors
across-the-board deference to protect the interpretive primacy of the
political branches and thereby improve the quality of deliberation in those
branches.
These forms of minimalism are analytically independent. One can be a
decisional minimalist and not a Thayerian minimalist, and so on.46 But
what unites all three is that—in different ways and to varying degrees—
they ask courts to do less and thus to leave ordinary political processes
relatively free of judicial interference.
I am not the first to attempt a typology of minimalisms. Until now, the
dominant approach has been to distinguish between “procedural” and
“substantive” minimalism.47 I find the substance-procedure dichotomy to
be unclear.48 This lack of clarity is exemplified by the fact that two of the

45

I am grateful to Professor Chuck Sabel for suggesting this frame. Cf. Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Democratic Experimentalism, in Searching for Contemporary Legal
Thought 477, 486 (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017) (exploring how
constitutional “values arise in mutually transformative dialogue between individuals and
institutions in their immediate contexts and courts articulating the framing values of the
society as a whole”); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577,
581 (1993) (“Courts serve to facilitate and mold the national dialogue concerning the meaning
of the Constitution . . . .”).
46
For a brief discussion of the way that different forms of minimalism interact, see infra
note 153.
47
See Devins, supra note 8, at 941; Peters, supra note 43, at 1459–60; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 123, 124–25 (2005) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Testing Minimalism] (distinguishing “procedural minimalism” from “minimalism’s
substance” (emphasis omitted)).
48
Cf. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale
L.J. 333, 336–37 (1933) (noting that the distinction between “substance” and “procedure” is
illusory and unhelpful for at least some purposes).
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leadings scholars of minimalism seem to use the terms in opposite
senses.49 Hence, my own proposed trichotomy, to which I now turn.
A. Decisional Minimalism
Decisional minimalism is in some ways an old and familiar idea. As
early as 1875, the Supreme Court extolled the “rule,” which “ought
always to govern this court, to decide nothing beyond what is necessary
to the judgment we are to render.”50 Justice Brandeis later made the same
point in his Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority concurrence: “The
Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” 51 The modern
academic most responsible for giving minimalism its present prominence
and theoretical grounding is Professor Cass Sunstein,52 though it has also
been embraced by a number of other public law scholars, including

49
Compare Peters, supra note 43, at 1461 (“Both narrowness and shallowness are
manifestations of procedural minimalism . . . .”), with Devins, supra note 8, at 941
(“Substantive minimalism . . . envisions that the Supreme Court will decide the dispute at
hand but issue ‘narrow and shallow’ decisions.”).
50
United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 618 (1876).
51
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S.
Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 596 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is . . . incumbent upon
this Court to avoid putting fetters upon the future by needless pronouncements today.”); PDK
Lab’ys Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to
decide more . . . .”). Justice Holmes meant something similar when he said in a common law
admiralty context: “I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they
can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.” S. Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In other words, judges should
make small choices to fill small gaps. See Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The
Holmesian Judge in Theory and Practice, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 19, 35 (1995) (explicating
Holmes’ rather opaque metaphor); id. at 45 (“The Holmesian judge is an austere
minimalist . . . .”).
52
Greene, supra note 43, at 624 (calling Sunstein “the American academy’s most articulate
minimalist”). Some credit Sunstein with “coin[ing]” the phrase judicial minimalism, Grove,
supra note 38, at 5, though the word was in circulation earlier. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 44,
at 57 n.158 (describing Thayer and Bickel as holding a “minimalist position on judicial
review”).
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Professors Robert Burt,53 William Eskridge,54 and Jamal Greene,55 as well
as then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg.56
Minimalist opinions exhibit two features.57 First, they are narrow
rather than wide—that is, they “decide the case at hand” and “do not
decide other cases too, except to the extent that one decision necessarily
bears on other cases.”58 Second, they are shallow rather than deep—that
is, they eschew ambitious and abstract theoretical justifications.59 A court
can resolve a concrete case without an account of the ultimate theoretical
foundations of its judgment.60 For instance, two judges might have
different foundational theories of the First Amendment or political
morality but nevertheless agree (and join an opinion stating) that political
speech warrants special protection.61

53
Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict, 5–6 (1992); see Peters, supra note 43, at
1470 (“Robert Burt might be considered a progenitor of the new judicial minimalism.”).
Sunstein acknowledged the affinities of his program and Burt’s program. Sunstein, Leaving
Things Undecided, supra note 33, at 8 n.5.
54
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 Yale L.J. 1279, 1310–11 (2005).
55
Greene, supra note 43, at 646–49. While Greene defends “narrow” judicial decisions that
give constitutional culture “breathing room” to grow and develop, he is skeptical of
shallowness because, in his view, shallowness can “obscure the basis for the Court’s
decisions” and thus undermine public deliberation. Id. at 647–48. Greene’s critique of the
regnant rights-as-trumps framework also bears a family resemblance to minimalism, in that it
favors “particularist” resolutions of rights disputes. See Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as
Trumps?, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 61–63 (2018). Rather than “homogenize the law,” Greene
suggests that “substantive norms cannot be realized without significant specificity in their
application.” Id. at 62.
56
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992).
57
In this Section, I use “minimalist” and “minimalism” as a shorthand to refer to “decisional
minimalism.” In later sections, I will specify which form of minimalism I mean.
58
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 10.
59
Id. at 11–14.
60
Id. at 13.
61
Sunstein calls this an “incompletely theorized agreement[].” Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted);
see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1735–36
(1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements]. Professor Lawrence
Solum has similarly defended “shallow” judicial decision making. Lawrence B. Solum, Public
Legal Reason, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1501 (2006) (“Law’s deliberations should be shallow and
not deep.”). See also John Rawls’s acknowledgement that “justice as fairness deliberately
stays on the surface, philosophically speaking,” John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysical, 14 Phil. & Pub. Affs. 223, 230 (1985), and Richard Rorty’s argument on the
value of “philosophical superficiality” to liberal democracy. Richard Rorty, The Priority of
Democracy to Philosophy, in The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present 381,
393–94 (Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin eds., 2011).
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Narrowness and shallowness are relative, rather than absolute,
characteristics.62 A stylized example will illustrate this point. Imagine a
stripped-down process for resolving disputes where two parties present
arguments to a judge. The most narrow and shallow disposition would be
for the judge simply to declare one party the winner with no explanation
at all. Such a disposition would not establish a principle broader than the
particular case and would not exhibit any theoretical depth. But that level
of reticence is not always possible or desirable, especially in a federal
courtroom. It inheres in our ideal of the rule of law and our basic
expectations of judicial craft that judges will give reasons for their
dispositions.63 To give a reason is typically to appeal to some governing
principle that is more general than the particularities of the dispute before
the judge.64 And, in a legal culture like ours, which values consistency in
the disposition of cases and adheres to a version of stare decisis, to decide
a case by reference to some general principle may effectively resolve
other cases as well.65
Decisional minimalism does not negate the obligation to give reasons;
rather, it concerns the scope of the reasons given. A decision is narrow,
relatively speaking, if it resolves the dispute at hand and fewer other cases
62

Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 10, 16; Sunstein, Testing Minimalism,
supra note 47, at 125–26. They are also technically independent of one another; a decision
may be both narrow and deep or both broad and shallow. See Greene, supra note 43, at 625;
Gerken, supra note 43, at 1440–41. That said, “[a]mbitious reasoning typically produces
width.” Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 18. For that reason, a deep but narrow
opinion may be dynamically unstable because the deep reasoning may lead to wider opinions
in the future.
63
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 387 (1978)
(“We tend to think of the judge . . . as one who decides and who gives reasons for his
decision.”); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 633 (1995) (“The
conventional picture of legal decision-making . . . is one in which giving reasons is both the
norm and the ideal.”). While federal judges are not, for the most part, legally required to give
reasons, cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, as a practical matter “[r]eason-giving is so instinctive and
commonplace in the U.S. judicial culture that the practice has hardly needed formalization.”
Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law
Approach, 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 483, 531 (2015).
64
Schauer, supra note 63, at 638 (“[R]easons are typically propositions of greater generality
than the conclusions they are reasons for . . . .”).
65
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 377 (Hillard, Gray,
& Co., Bos., 1833) (“The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but the principles
of the decision are held, as precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature.
This is the constant practice under our whole system of jurisprudence.”); Henry J. Friendly,
Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 758 (1982) (quoting Ward v. James [1966]
1 QB 273, 294 (Eng.)) (“[The] most basic principle of jurisprudence [is] that ‘we must act
alike in all cases of like nature.’ ”).
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than another possible disposition.66 And a decision is shallow, relatively
speaking, if it stops short of rooting its governing principle in more
general theoretical grounds. To call a decision “minimalist” is not to
identify an immanent feature that can be measured in a vacuum but rather
to compare the decision to other possible decisions that could have been
issued to resolve the same legal dispute.
A rather humdrum example may help to flesh these concepts out. In
AKM LLC v. Secretary of Labor, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration fined a company for violating its recordkeeping
regulations, and the company responded that the fines were barred by the
statute of limitations in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH
Act”).67 A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued
three separate opinions. The majority opinion, signed by two judges,
reserved the question whether Chevron deference applied to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute of limitations but held that the statute of
limitations in the OSH Act could not reasonably be read to authorize a
continuing violation theory for the failure to create records.68 Judge
Garland, concurring in the judgment, would have resolved the case on the
ground that, whatever the meaning of the statute of limitations, the
regulations that the company had allegedly violated did not create any
continuing obligations.69 Finally, Judge Brown wrote a concurrence
explaining why, in her view, a court does not owe Chevron deference to

66
It will sometimes be difficult to judge relative narrowness because the principles in
question operate in different spheres. A decision based on Article III standing, for instance,
may be “narrow” in the sense that it leaves a merits question undecided, but it may be “broad”
in the sense that it affects access to courts in many other substantive areas. See Siegel, supra
note 43, at 1981. It may be impossible “to rank all principles in a single scale of generality.”
R.M. Hare, Principles, in Essays in Ethical Theory 49, 51 (1989); see Schauer, supra note 63,
at 639 n.16. Professor Ronald Dworkin has made a similar point with respect to ascertaining
relative shallowness. Ronald Dworkin, Reply, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 431, 449 (1997). Still, whatever
the difficulties of abstract definition and borderline cases, judges and lawyers will in many, if
not most, instances have a reliable pragmatic intuition about which disposition is more
“minimalist.” Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1195 (1987) (“Although the categories do sometimes
blur or otherwise depend on one another, it would be a plain if familiar error to suppose that
‘unless a distinction can be made rigorous and precise it isn’t really a distinction at all.’ ”
(quoting John Searle, The World Turned Upside Down, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 27, 1983, at
74, 78), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1983/10/27/the-word-turned-upside-down/ [https:
//perma.cc/6BLL-GA2W]).
67
675 F.3d 752, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
68
Id. at 753–59.
69
Id. at 759–64 (Garland, J., concurring in the judgment).
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an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision limiting the agency’s
jurisdiction, and, by extension, a statute of limitations.70
The narrowest of those three opinions was Judge Garland’s. By
focusing only on the specific regulations that the company was cited for
violating, he did not have to reach any questions about whether the statute
of limitations would “admit of a continuing violation theory under other
circumstances.”71 The majority opinion was wider than Judge Garland’s
opinion but narrower than Judge Brown’s concurrence: it bracketed the
question of Chevron deference, but, by focusing on the meaning of the
statute of limitations, it could have (and in fact did have) impacts in other
contexts.72 Judge Brown’s opinion was the widest: her discussion of
Chevron deference would have had significant implications for a wide
range of administrative law cases. Her opinion was also the deepest: she
expressly resorted to “first principles” about Chevron deference and the
judicial role.73
Why might a minimalist decision, like Judge Garland’s, be better than
a relatively more “maximalist” one? There are two classes of reasons—
one class sounding in democracy and the other in judicial administration.
The democratic case for minimalism begins with the point that
narrower decisions will foreclose fewer options to the political
branches.74 If a court strikes down a law on narrow constitutional grounds,
it will leave open more possible statutes that the legislature might enact
in the future. Similarly, in the AKM case, Judge Garland’s disposition
would have allowed the agency to promulgate new regulations more
clearly imposing continuing obligations without prejudging whether such
regulations would conform to the statute. Narrow, case-specific decisions
can then lead to productive dialogue between the courts and political
70

Id. at 764–69 (Brown, J., concurring).
Id. at 759 (Garland, J., concurring in the judgment).
72
Id. at 754–59. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit endorsed the
D.C. Circuit’s reasoning and observed that “nothing in the majority opinion purports to limit
its reach to Part 1904 record-making regulations.” Delek Refin., Ltd. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Rev. Comm’n, 845 F.3d 170, 176 n.7 (5th Cir. 2016). A D.C. district court applied
the AKM LLC majority’s reasoning about the nature of continuing violations to a disability
discrimination claim. Leiterman v. Johnson, 60 F. Supp. 3d 166, 187–88 (D.D.C. 2014).
73
AKM LLC, 675 F.3d at 765.
74
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 26. Sunstein’s conception of democracy
is not simple majoritarianism. As he puts it, “[t]he American system is one of representative
rather than direct democracy, partly because of a judgment that political deliberation can best
be promoted through a representative system.” Id. at 133. His primary concern is the extent to
which a judicial decision forecloses options to representative branches of government.
71
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process, which can, in turn, inform future judicial decisions.75 Then-Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg defended the Court’s deployment of intermediate
scrutiny in the sex equality cases that she had litigated on these grounds:
the Court “did not utterly condemn the legislature’s product” and “put
forward no grand philosophy.”76 Instead, it “opened a dialogue with the
political branches of government,” essentially instructing them to
“rethink ancient positions” on sex equality.77
Minimalism may also do more than just leave space for democracy—
it may be affirmatively democracy-promoting.78 That is, “[m]inimalist
courts can provide spurs and prods to promote democratic deliberation
itself.”79 For instance, when a court strikes down a law on vagueness
grounds or construes a statute in light of the canon of constitutional
avoidance, the decision may provoke the political branches to respond. In
that way, even a counter-majoritarian decision invalidating a statute can,
if it is narrow, be in the ultimate service of deliberative democracy by
ensuring that decisions are made deliberately by accountable actors.80
Finally, minimalist decisions respect political liberalism and what John
Rawls has called “the fact of pluralism.”81 In a large, free, and
heterogeneous democracy, reasonable people may disagree on
fundamental questions.82 The basic idea of political liberalism is that
“diverse people, operating from their own foundational accounts, can
converge on a range of basic principles, thus making it possible to achieve

75

Eskridge, supra note 54, at 1283, 1310–11.
Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1204.
77
Id. On intermediate scrutiny as a form of judicial minimalism, see Jay D. Wexler,
Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 298, 303 (1998).
78
For a somewhat skeptical discussion of this rationale, see infra notes 253–57 and
accompanying text.
79
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 27.
80
Id. at 31.
81
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (1987);
id. at 4 (“[T]he plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the
meaning, value and purpose of human life . . . affirmed by the citizens of democratic
societies.”). The classic account of political liberalism is John Rawls, Political Liberalism
(1996). Revealingly, Professor Michael Sandel has labeled as “minimalist” the form of
liberalism that “proposes bracketing controversial moral and religious issues for the sake of
securing social cooperation.” Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 521, 531 (1989).
82
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 1 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 57–59 (1997); Eskridge, supra note 54,
at 1293–96.
76
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an ‘overlapping consensus’ on those principles.”83 A narrow and shallow
disposition of a case may itself reflect a kind of “overlapping consensus;”
judges may converge on particular resolutions of cases or specific
governing principles even if they disagree on fundamental jurisprudential
questions.84 In that way, judges may embody a similar overlapping
consensus in the polity.85 Further, as Jamal Greene has observed,
“[n]arrow” judicial decisions give constitutional culture “breathing room”
to grow and develop.86 Giving social conflict the space “to play out for
longer rather than cutting it off through what Robert Cover called
‘jurispathic’ court decisions can serve the values of a pluralistic,
participatory democracy.”87
The second class of justifications for minimalism has to do with
judicial administration—reducing the burdens of decision making and
minimizing the impact of incorrect decisions. Judges, like everyone else,
are boundedly rational.88 They face limits of time, intellect, and
information that may lead them to err.89 Minimalism caters to this lack of

83

Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 50 (citing Rawls, supra note 81).
Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 61, at 1735–36 & n.8. In
addition to facilitating an overlapping consensus among different judges, a minimalist
outcome may enable several different accepted forms of argument in a pluralist legal culture
to converge. There are several accepted modalities of constitutional argument—textual,
historical, structural, prudential, and so on. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of
the Constitution 7 (1982); David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-Modalities, 119 Mich.
L. Rev. 729, 730–31 (2021). To the extent the modalities may tug in different directions in a
particular case, a narrower and shallower disposition could reflect a kind of “overlapping
consensus” of the modalities of constitutional argument. In this way, minimalism could help
the modalities cohere. Cf. Fallon, supra note 66, at 1189–90 (analyzing the “commensurability
problem” of modalities pointing in different directions).
85
The practice of implementing the Constitution through doctrinal tests may have a similar
justification. Justices may agree on doctrines to operationalize constitutional values even if
they disagree on deeper questions of constitutional meaning and theory. “Doctrine clearly
abets incompletely theorized judgments by furnishing a framework in which determinations
can be reached and ‘minimalistically’ rationalized—that is, explained as defensible within the
doctrinal framework, even if the framework is not itself justified by any broader theory.”
Fallon, supra note 82, at 116. The same could be said of precedent itself. See Amy Coney
Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711, 1711 (2013)
(“[A]n overlooked function of stare decisis is mediating jurisprudential disagreement.”).
86
Greene, supra note 43, at 647–48.
87
Id. at 647.
88
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 51–53; see Christine Jolls, Bounded
Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, in 1 Oxford Handbook of Law and
Economics 60 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
89
Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353, 362–66 (2006).
84
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omniscience and encourages a kind of judicial humility.90 A narrow and
shallow decision will generally be less difficult to do well—requiring less
time, cognitive energy, and data—than a wider and deeper decision.91
And a narrow and shallow disposition will make inevitable errors of either
law or foresight less damaging. Sunstein calls this “minimiz[ing] the sum
of decision costs and error costs.”92
Take the AKM case discussed above: a decision focused on interpreting
a set of discrete regulations is less resource-intensive than a (competent)
decision about the meaning of a more general statute of limitations or the
application of a general doctrine of deference in administrative law. Those
latter issues require greater study of the implications of any decision and
the possibility—if not inevitability—that some implications will be
overlooked. And an erroneous holding will be costlier the wider it is. In
fact, Judge Brown’s view of Chevron deference was ultimately rejected
by the Supreme Court.93 If the D.C. Circuit panel had endorsed her view
of Chevron deference, then the D.C. Circuit as a whole might have
employed the wrong standard of deference (measured against the
Supreme Court’s ultimate understanding of the issue) in a wide range of
cases.94
If these are minimalism’s justifications, when should minimalism be
deployed? Sunstein acknowledges that minimalism is not a universal
prescription. A minimalist decision from the Supreme Court may
“export” decision and error costs to other officials; it may lead to
“unfairness through dissimilar treatment of the similarly situated”; and
some issues may not, in fact, be amenable to democratic deliberation at
90

Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment
on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1292–
93 (1997) (defending the importance of judicial humility).
91
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 47; see also Henry J. Friendly, “Some
Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1302 (1975) (observing that “[c]ourts are good at
deciding cases” but “bad at drafting legislation; typically they see the case at hand and a few
others but not the entire spectrum”).
92
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 46. But see Justin Fox & Georg Vanberg,
Narrow Versus Broad Judicial Decisions, 26 J. Theoretical Pol. 355, 357 (2014) (arguing that,
in some circumstances, broad judicial decisions can elicit useful information from
policymakers).
93
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296–301 (2013).
94
I am cognizant of the difficulty of locating some Archimedean point from which to
evaluate whether a judicial decision is right or wrong. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting
Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 685, 751–52, 757 (2009). But in
reviewing lower court decisions—especially in the context of considering the costs of errors—
the Supreme Court’s resolution seems like a reasonable, pragmatic proxy.
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all.95 The choice between minimalism and maximalism is a pragmatic
judgment that cannot be reduced to a precise algorithm.96 But Sunstein
suggests that a non-minimalist decision may make sense “if diverse
judges have considerable confidence in the merits of that solution, if the
solution can reduce costly uncertainty for other branches, future courts,
and litigants (and hence decision costs would otherwise be high), or if
advance planning is important.”97 These are guideposts, not rules.
One final point of clarification: I understand decisional minimalism as
a theory of adjudication, not as a theory of interpretation.98 In other words,
minimalism is “a normative theory about how to fashion a plausible
approach to decision making, not to meaning.”99 Sunstein calls it a
“mood.”100 One can, in theory, be an originalist minimalist, if one takes
an originalist approach to ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution but
a minimalist approach to specifying how that meaning plays out in a
particular case.101 Or one may be an anti-oligarchy minimalist, a
“common good” minimalist, and so on.102 Sunstein (especially in later
writings) sometimes uses “minimalism” in a more capacious sense to
describe a minimal set of substantive, liberal-democratic commitments
that judges ought to apply or to describe an interpretive theory opposed

95

Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 33, at 27–30.
Id. at 30.
97
Id.
98
See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1823, 1823
(1997) (drawing this distinction); see also Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic
Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1739, 1739–40 (2013) (“A
view about what the law is or what it consists of does not by itself entail or presuppose any
position about how judges are supposed to adjudicate constitutional disputes; and a view about
how judges should go about adjudicating constitutional disputes does not by itself entail or
presuppose any position about what the law is or consists of.”).
99
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Minimalism, Perfectionism, and Common Law Constitutionalism:
Reflections on Sunstein’s and Fleming’s Efforts to Find the Sweet Spot in Constitutional
Theory, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2997, 3001 (2007).
100
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 257; cf. Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (describing judicial deference to administrative agencies as
a “mood”).
101
Cf. Perry, supra note 43, at 106 (“One can be both an originalist and a minimalist . . . , but
one need not be.”). Professor Perry was using “minimalist” primarily in its Thayerian sense,
but the distinction he makes between interpretation and specification holds for decisional
minimalism too. See id. at 87.
102
See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution:
Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy 8–12 (2022); Adrian
Vermeule, Common Good Constitutionalism: Recovering the Classical Legal Tradition 1
(2022).
96
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to originalism.103 In this Article, I use “decisional minimalism” in a more
limited way—a theory of adjudication that is agnostic about primary
interpretive method.104
B. Prudential Minimalism
While decisional minimalism is concerned with how judges fashion
opinions, prudential minimalism involves techniques for avoiding or
limiting judicial involvement in the first place. Both minimalisms are
concerned with what Sunstein terms “leaving things undecided,”105 but
they achieve that goal through different means. Prudential minimalism
does so through the discretionary withholding of the judicial power while
decisional minimalism does so through crafting “narrow” and “shallow”
opinions.106 There is some overlap between these categories: an
unexplained order denying certiorari, for example, could be seen as a form
of either decisional minimalism or prudential minimalism. But these two
minimalisms leave things undecided in different ways.
103
See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 61–72; Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals
in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for America, at xii–xiii (2005); cf.
James E. Fleming, The Incredible Shrinking Constitutional Theory: From the Partial
Constitution to the Minimal Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2885, 2912 (2007) (“[I]n
Radicals in Robes, the distinction between a theory of the Constitution and a theory of judicial
review (or judicial strategy) becomes blurred.”).
104
The minimalists canvassed in this section mostly focus on constitutional law. That may
be due to the fact that constitutional law is where the democratic stakes of adjudication are
highest: if federal judges claim interpretive supremacy over the Constitution, see Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), then constitutional adjudications will trench most powerfully
on the prerogatives of the political branches. But the virtues of decisional minimalism are not
confined to constitutional cases. See supra note 37. Many of the justifications for minimalism
are based on judicial capacities and decision costs, which are constant features of the judiciary.
And, even as to the democracy-based justifications, many non-constitutional decisions of
public law will displace interpretations of the executive branch, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984), or will put in place a rule without
current popular and political support, given the inertial forces built into the Constitution’s
lawmaking processes. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The
Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2109, 2119 (2015).
105
Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 33, at 101.
106
See Greene, supra note 43, at 625 (distinguishing Sunstein’s and Bickel’s brands of
minimalism); Mark Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Regimes: Alexander Bickel
and Cass Sunstein, in The Judiciary and American Democracy, supra note 43, at 23, 31
(“Where Bickel urged the Court to exercise political judgment in deciding which cases to
decide and then to make fully principled decisions on the merits, Sunstein asks the Court to
exercise political judgment at both stages.”). For a discussion of how the passive virtues—i.e.,
prudential minimalism—can complement Sunstein’s decisional minimalism, see Neal Devins,
The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1971, 1982–84 (1999).
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The great exegete of prudential minimalism was Professor Alexander
Bickel.107 In the Least Dangerous Branch, he famously observed that
judicial review “is a deviant institution in the American democracy”
because it is a “counter-majoritarian force in our system.”108 That
deviance turned out to be the judiciary’s strength. Judicial review was
justifiable, for Bickel, because it “injects into representative government
something that is not already there”—a commitment to “principle.”109
Government should serve not only “our immediate material needs but also
certain enduring values.”110 And courts have the “habit[s] of mind” and
“institutional customs” to “sort[] out the enduring values of a society.”111
The judiciary thus brings something new and important to the table of
American government.
This was, so far, standard “legal process” thinking.112 But then came
Bickel’s swerve: there were circumstances, he thought, where it was
impossible or unwise—imprudent, to use a more Bickellian word—for
the Supreme Court to intervene in a principled fashion. In those cases, the
Court should avail itself of a suite of techniques he called the “passive
virtues” to stay its hand and avoid reaching certain issues on the merits.
The passive virtues would allow the Court to give “leeway to expediency

107
See Jonathan S. Gould, Law Within Congress, 129 Yale L.J. 1946, 2012 (2020) (calling
Bickel an “advocate[] for judicial minimalism”); Peters, supra note 43, at 1457 (referring to
Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch as “the original minimalist manifesto”).
108
Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34, at 16, 18.
109
Id. at 58.
110
Id. at 24.
111
Id. at 26. In this view, Bickel was following his teacher, Henry Hart. Id. at 27.
112
The core principle of the legal process school, which peaked in the American legal
academy in the mid-twentieth century, was “institutional settlement”: the idea that, even if
people disagree about substantive ends, “the legal system could provide rules and procedures
sufficiently fair and reasonable that its resolutions of disputes—its ‘settlements’ by
legislatures, agencies, or courts—would be accepted by the disputants.” 3 G. Edward White,
Law in American History 353 (2019). A “settlement” would be acceptable if disputes were
assigned to institutions according to their distinctive competences. Id. at 353–54; Rubin, supra
note 13, at 1396; see also Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks,
99 Va. L. Rev. 1, 29–30 (2013) (discussing an apparent conflict between the concept of the
“institutional settlement” and purposivist adjudication). The distinctive competence of courts,
according to process theory, is to resolve cases according to reasoned argument and principle.
Fuller, supra note 63, at 366; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1959); see White, supra, at 354–55. These ideas were propounded
in an influential set of course materials put together by Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks
at Harvard in the 1950s and ‘60s. Barzun, supra, at 3 & n.3 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert
M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)).
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without abandoning principle” and therefore “make possible performance
of the Court’s grand function.”113 Bickel then catalogued these
techniques. They included denials of certiorari, dismissals of appeals
falling within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, dismissals for lack of
standing or ripeness, deciding cases on non-constitutional grounds, and
the political question doctrine.114 In addition, the Court could mold its
equitable remedies in a way that would mediate the tension between
expediency and principle.115
These techniques, in themselves, were not new.116 But Bickel radically
reconceived them. His key departure from the received wisdom of the
legal process school was to argue that the Court did not need to be
principled in its application of the passive virtues.117 “[T]he techniques
and allied devices for staying the Court’s hand . . . cannot themselves be
principled in the sense in which we have a right to expect adjudications
on the merits to be principled.”118 Rather, they “mark the point . . . where
the Court is most a political animal.”119 But to be “political” did not mean
to wield “unchanneled, undirected, uncharted discretion.”120 For Bickel,
113

Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34, at 71. It was critical to Bickel that the
passive virtues be separate from the merits. Otherwise, by upholding some government action
on the merits, the Court would validate that action in the popular mind by stamping it with the
imprimatur of principle. Id. at 128–29. This function of judicial review was explored in
Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy 52 (1960).
See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., A Postscript for Charles Black: The Supreme Court and Race
During the Progressive Era, 95 Yale L.J. 1681, 1681 (1986) (noting that one of Black’s “most
important insights about judicial review” is that its “prime importance lies not in its checking
function but rather in its capacity to give legitimacy to the exercise of governmental power”).
114
Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34, at 111–98.
115
Id. at 247–54.
116
Bickel’s list was much influenced by Justice Brandeis and his old boss Justice
Frankfurter. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist
Constitution, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 521, 527, 536 & n.70 (1976). It also resembled the
taxonomy of justiciability doctrines offered in the first edition of Hart and Wechsler’s famous
casebook. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 169, 204 (1968).
117
The orthodox view was that the “judicial process” had to rest “with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved.” Wechsler, supra note 112, at 15 (emphasis added). Bickel
was quickly remonstrated by the votaries of legal process for his apostasy. Gerald Gunther,
The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in
Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3, 9–10, 24–25 (1964); Herbert Wechsler, Reviews, 75
Yale L.J. 672, 674 (1966) (reviewing Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34).
118
Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34, at 132.
119
Id.
120
Id.
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“[t]he antithesis of principle in an institution that represents decency and
reason is not whim or even expediency, but prudence.”121
Prudence is a central concept in Bickel’s judicial and political
philosophy.122 It denotes a kind of “practical wisdom,” an attitude that
respects the complexity of human institutions even as it undertakes to
align them more closely with our political ideals.123 The opposite of
prudence is the “overly philosophical insistence on principles for their
own sake” and the incapacity to tolerate any gap, even temporary,
between principle and reality.124 The passive virtues were, for Bickel, the
“modalities of prudence,” the techniques at the Court’s disposal for acting
prudently while remaining, in the end, a defender of principle.125 I group
them under the rubric of prudential minimalism.
C. Thayerian Minimalism
A third version of minimalism tells judges to refrain from striking
down laws or other government policies except in cases of clear
illegality.126 It is named after its academic progenitor, Professor James
Bradley Thayer. In an influential article published in 1893, Thayer argued
that a court should only invalidate a law of Congress on constitutional
grounds when Congress has made a clear legal mistake.127 He gave a few
interrelated reasons: First, as a structural matter, Congress is charged with
judging, in the first instance, whether a law is constitutional in the course
of passing it, while the judiciary’s input is only “incidental and
postponed,” if it comes at all.128 The judiciary should respect the

121

Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Yale L.J.
1567, 1569 (1985).
123
Id. at 1569–70 (quoting Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 23 (1975)).
124
Id. at 1569, 1590.
125
Id. at 1584.
126
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759, 846 (1997) (“Minimalism requires
that an act of Congress not be invalidated unless ‘clearly’ unconstitutional.” (citation
omitted)); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative
Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 245, 245 n.4 (1995)
(discussing “Thayer’s minimalism”).
127
Thayer, supra note 35, at 144; see also Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End
of Judicial Restraint, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 621, 624 (2012) (arguing that Thayer’s rule of the
clear mistake had roots in the early republic).
128
Thayer, supra note 35, at 135–36.
122
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Congress’s “primary authority to interpret” the Constitution.129 Second,
the Constitution is made up of broad generalities that are subject to
reasonable disagreement and must be applied to the “complex, everunfolding exigencies of government.”130 Congress is best suited to that
interpretive task, and a congressional choice that “is rational is
constitutional.”131 Third, an overactive judiciary could vitiate Congress’s
own sense of responsibility to consider constitutional matters
conscientiously.132 For these reasons, the Court should not resolve a case
based on its “independent judgment” of the constitutional merits but
should ask only whether Congress’s constitutional judgment is
reasonable.133
Thayer’s essay had a huge influence in the Progressive Era and
beyond.134 Justice Holmes “heartily” endorsed it,135 Justice Frankfurter
called it the “most important single essay” in constitutional law,136 and
Judge Learned Hand was deeply impressed too.137 Thayer’s star waned
for a time as the Warren Court revivified liberal faith in the judiciary.138
But Thayer is now back in several forms.
129

Id. On the practical impossibility of subjecting most of the activities of modern
government to judicial review, see Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing
Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 251–53 (1994).
130
Thayer, supra note 35, at 144.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 156.
133
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7–14
(1983).
134
Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer Upon the Work of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 71, 71–74 (1978); Steven G. Calabresi,
Originalism and James Bradley Thayer, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1419, 1420 (2019). Thayer’s
progressive acolytes transformed his position in important ways. Most notably, they extended
the call for restraint to judicial review of state legislation in addition to federal legislation. See
Edward A. Purcell, Learned Hand: The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43
Buff. L. Rev. 873, 892–94 (1995).
135
David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 Duke L.J.
449, 462 n.34 (1994) (quoting Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2,
1893) (on file with Harvard Law School Library)).
136
Felix Frankfurter Reminisces 299–301 (1960) (recorded in talks with Dr. Harlan B.
Phillips); see also Samuel Moyn, On Human Rights and Majority Politics: Felix Frankfurter’s
Democratic Theory, 52 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1135, 1150–53 (2019) (describing Thayer’s
influence on Justice Frankfurter).
137
See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 41–43 (2d ed. 2011).
138
Cf. Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs.
149, 149 (2004) (“When the ideological valence of Supreme Court decisions shifts,
constitutional theorizing about judicial review tends to shift as well.”). I use the word “liberal”
to distinguish the defenders of the Warren Court from Thayer’s progressive supporters. Cf.
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One avowed neo-Thayerian is Professor Adrian Vermeule. He bases
his defense of Thayerian minimalism on “institutional capacities and
systemic effects” and suggests that judges should employ “a rule-bound
decision-procedure for constitutional cases,” enforcing “clear and specific
constitutional texts” but “defer[ring] to legislatures on the interpretation
of constitutional texts” that are vague or ambiguous.139 Professor Jeremy
Waldron wrote an influential challenge to judicial review of legislation.140
Another group of modern Thayerian minimalists, like Thayer’s original
followers, are reform-minded progressives who want to get the Supreme
Court out of the way. Professors Ryan Doerfler and Samuel Moyn, for
instance, propose disempowering the Supreme Court in various ways to
weaken judicial review of federal legislation.141 Among other things, they
suggest implementing Thayer’s “clear mistake” rule by requiring a
supermajority vote on the Supreme Court to invalidate a federal statute.142
Professors Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman have also advanced a
number of Supreme Court reform proposals that are “descend[ed]” from
Thayer and his concern that courts “do not improperly usurp democratic
authority.”143 Some of this neo-Thayerian work builds upon the “popular
constitutionalism” movement, which also sought to cut down the power
of the Supreme Court and relocate interpretive authority over the
Constitution in the “people.”144 Further, Professors David Pozen and
Emma Kaufman, The New Legal Liberalism, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187, 195–96 (2019)
(distinguishing liberalism and progressivism).
139
Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal
Interpretation 230–88 (2006).
140
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346
(2006).
141
See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 31, at 1725.
142
Id. at 1727. Others have made or considered similar proposals for supermajority voting
rules in the Supreme Court. See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme
Court, 129 Yale L.J. 148, 182 (2019); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule:
Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 893, 894 (2003);
Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule:
Lessons from the Past, 78 Ind. L.J. 73, 78 (2003).
143
Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy,
130 Yale L.J.F. 821, 826 (2021).
144
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 182, 186–87 (1999); Larry
D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 247–48
(2004). For a brief history of popular constitutionalism, see Jeremy K. Kessler & David E.
Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1819, 1854–59 (2016). Several years earlier, Professor Robin West also mounted a
progressive case for Thayerianism. See Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism:
Reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment 290–318 (1994).
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Adam Samaha recently proposed another version of Thayerian
minimalism. They suggest “a presumption against constitutionalizing
contested issues” because the norms of constitutional argument exclude
considerations that likely shape the way that most people would resolve
those contested issues.145 In all, Thayer is not wanting for adherents in the
modern academy.
***
To sum up: Decisional minimalism prefers decisions that are narrow
and shallow. It is attuned to empirical facts and suspicious of abstraction.
As a result, it tends to favor standards over rules, at least in the early stages
of inductively building up some area of law. It is temperamentally humble
and pragmatic, respecting the limits of judicial foresight and competence.
It increases the space in which the political branches may maneuver.
Finally, it buttresses pluralism by limiting the violence judges do to the
“nomic” outgrowths of constitutional culture.
Prudential minimalism cautions judges that they are custodians of the
judiciary. Judges must decide cases on principled grounds. Where a felt
need for pragmatic compromise makes principled decision impossible, a
judge should avoid decision rather than wound the judiciary’s
institutional health. Beyond justiciability doctrines, one appropriate way
for a court to equilibrate principle and pragmatism is to temper the remedy
it issues in a case.
Thayerian minimalism recognizes that the judicial duty to declare the
law in resolving a case does not entail the duty to exercise independent
judgment on all legal questions. And it posits that judges sensitive to their
institutional positions should defer to reasonable judgments of the
legislature on the meaning of the Constitution.
II. THE CASE FOR LOWER COURT MINIMALISM
With this conceptual vocabulary in place, I turn to the heart of the
paper—evaluating minimalism in the lower courts. I focus on decisional
minimalism, the most prominent modern variety, though I address
145

David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-Modalities, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 729, 792
(2021). Pozen and Samaha call this position “constitutional minimalism.” Id. As the label
indicates, it is in an important respect broader than typical Thayerian minimalism—it seeks to
reduce the scope of the Constitution for all actors, not just judges. Id. But one effect would be
a reduced scope for judicial review. Id.; see also David E. Pozen & Thomas P. Schmidt, The
Puzzles and Possibilities of Article V, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 2317, 2390 (2021) (advocating a
“Thayerian” approach to judging the validity of contested constitutional amendments).
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prudential and Thayerian minimalism too. The discussion walks through
several institutional features of lower courts, as they currently operate,
that distinguish them from the Supreme Court. It then assesses how those
features affect the case for minimalism.146 In brief, the features I consider
are the limits of judicial capacity, the quality of briefing (and relative
paucity of amicus briefs), the rules of precedent, the fact that cases are
decided either alone or in small panels, the mostly mandatory nature of
lower court jurisdiction, and democratic legitimacy deficits relative even
to the Supreme Court. Taken together, these features make the lower
courts different in kind from the Supreme Court, and that difference
makes minimalism in the lower courts a considerably more attractive
approach. The flip side is that minimalism holds less appeal for the
Supreme Court in light of its own institutional situation.
One helpful way to categorize the differences between the various
federal courts is to resort to the familiar scholarly distinction between a
“dispute resolution” and a “law declaration” court.147 A dispute resolution
court treats its power to expound the law as “incidental to its
responsibility to resolve a concrete dispute,” while a law declaration court
sees itself as vested with a “special function” to expound federal law.148
All federal courts, to some extent, partake in both models. But as one
moves down the federal judicial hierarchy, the law declaration function
cedes to dispute resolution. The Supreme Court, in its current institutional
form, is predominantly a law declaration court.149 It still formally decides
cases, but, at least since the Judges’ Bill of 1925, cases are largely
vehicles for “expounding and stabilizing principles of law for the benefit

146

The roles I describe, and even the basic structure of the system of federal courts, are not
mandated by the spare text of Article III. Conceptions of the nature and function of federal
courts have changed dramatically over our history. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary’s
Bicentennial, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (1989); Thomas H. Lee, Article IX, Article III, and the
First Congress: The Original Constitutional Plan for the Federal Courts, 1787–1792, 89
Fordham L. Rev. 1895 (2021).
147
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John Manning, Daniel Meltzer & David Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler’s the Federal Courts and the Federal System 73–74 (7th ed. 2015).
148
Id.; see Monaghan, supra note 38, at 668.
149
See infra Section II.E; Monaghan, supra note 2, at 23–26; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate
But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial
Power,” 80 B.U. L. Rev. 967, 993–96 (2000). Again, the Court’s role in the early republic was
very different from its role today. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Words That Made Us: America’s
Constitutional Conversation, 1760–1840, at 332–34 (2021); Thomas P. Schmidt, Courts in
Conversation, 2022 Mich. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6–13) (on file with author).
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of the people of the country.”150 Decisional minimalism is in deep tension
with the institutional premises of such a court. By contrast, the main
function of the federal district courts is not to declare law for the public’s
benefit but rather to enforce federal law against private parties and
government actors in particular disputes.151 Decisional minimalism fits
that function. The federal courts of appeals have a mixed role: they review
resolutions of particular disputes by the district courts, but they have “a
related function in helping to create a stable body of national law.”152
They can discharge that function, however, in a manner very different
from the Supreme Court: because they have a large, mandatory docket,
they can declare the law through modest and interstitial interventions.
And for the reasons discussed in this Part, they should do so.153

150

Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1922) (statement of Chief Justice Taft).
151
This function, too, is a product of history. In the early republic, lower federal courts were
largely commercial courts, hearing maritime and diversity cases. See Lee, supra note 146, at
1912, 1939. But the aftermath of the Civil War brought a “sea change in the structure of federal
jurisdiction.” Meltzer, supra note 146, at 425. Congress passed civil rights laws enforceable
in federal court, extended federal habeas corpus to state prisoners, and granted general federal
question jurisdiction. Id. Federal courts became primarily concerned with enforcing federal
law. Id. at 426. That trend continued into the twentieth century. Judith Resnik, Revising Our
“Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1831, 1847 (2016).
152
Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 551 (1969).
153
In the discussion that follows I evaluate each type of minimalism in isolation. If the
judiciary were to embrace all three types in tandem, they might interact in complex ways.
Three potential complications stand out. First, a decisional minimalist court might be hesitant
to embrace Thayerian minimalism, because it is a broad rule. But Thayerianism could be
imposed externally by the Supreme Court or Congress, rather than by the lower courts
themselves, so there is no necessary inconsistency. Second, a prudentially minimalist court
may have less need for Thayerian minimalism, because it can avoid invalidating laws by
refusing to decide and therefore achieve Thayerianism by other means. But, in addition to
Black’s caution about the legitimating function of judicial review, see supra note 113, the
present reality is that lower courts do not have enough tools of prudential minimalism at their
disposal to make this a viable possibility. See infra Section II.C. Third, one might think that
there would be less need for decisional minimalism on a Thayerian court because the court
would be less powerful and less important. But even a Thayerian court invalidates legislation
sometimes and must provide guidance on the outer bounds of the political branches’
discretion. And judicial review of federal legislation—the specific circumstance addressed by
Thayer—is only a portion of a lower court’s public law docket. Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring
the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 427, 524 (1997).
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A. Decisional Minimalism
1. The Time Chart of the Judges154
Lower court judges have a crushing workload. Congress “substantially
established the framework of the contemporary” judicial system in the
Evarts Act of 1891,155 and the federal courts of appeals assumed more or
less their current function in the so-called Judges’ Bill of 1925.156 Since
then, case numbers have mushroomed dramatically, yet the number of
judges has not come close to keeping pace. In 1960, there were 3,899
cases filed in the regional courts of appeals.157 By 2020, that number was
nearly fifty thousand—a twelvefold increase.158 In 1960, there were 68
authorized judges in the regional courts of appeals (and an additional 10
judgeships were added the following year).159 In 1990, that number had
increased only to 167, where it remains today.160 Putting these numbers
together, in 1960, there were about 57 appeals filed per judgeship; in
2020, there were about 289 appeals filed per judgeship.161 That is a
staggering difference—a 500% increase in judicial workload, based on
case numbers.
Taking a cue from Henry Hart, I will break down what the current
numbers mean in real terms. Assume generously that a federal circuit
judge does eight hours of substantive intellectual labor a day, five days a
154

I am alluding to Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 84, 84–86 (1959), breaking down the time available to Justices to draft opinions and
considering the implications for the Court’s role.
155
Fallon et al., supra note 147, at 29; Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. For more in-depth
histories of the lower federal courts, see Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business
of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System (1927); Richman & Reynolds,
supra note 22, at 1–9; Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal
Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 Calif. L. Rev.
789, 795–843 (2020); Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century
View, 38 S.C. L. Rev. 411, 411–31 (1987).
156
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 2.
157
Id. at 3.
158
Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., supra note 24.
159
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 5–6; see Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Authorized
Judgeships 6 (2022), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf [https://perma.c
c/N8ZG-Y7MC].
160
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 7–8.
161
The number is about the same if one includes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. See Marin K. Levy, The Promise of Senior Judges, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1237
n.59 (2021). For similar numbers on the workload crisis, see Menell & Vacca, supra note 155,
at 851–55.
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week, for forty-eight weeks per year. And assume that a judge is involved
in deciding 867 cases per year, since judges sit in panels of three. That
means that an appellate judge has roughly two hours and thirteen minutes
to give to each case.162 That includes reading the briefs, oral argument,
in-chambers discussion with clerks, opinion writing (for the author), and
opinion review (for the other members of the panel). It is, of course, an
absurdly small amount of time, and it does not even factor in
administrative responsibilities, en banc proceedings, motions panels, and
other miscellaneous impositions on a judge’s schedule. Hart thought that
twenty-four hours of devoted work was inadequate just for the opinionwriting phase of a case in the Supreme Court; circuit judges have a
minuscule fraction of that.163
This time crunch matters because the function of an appeal is not just
to give a thumbs up or a thumbs down to the trial court or agency;
appellate courts also give reasons for their dispositions that clarify the law
of the circuit.164 In 1960, it was possible to lavish most appeals with what
Professors William Richman and Williams Reynolds call the “Learned
Hand Treatment”: this consisted of review of the briefs, oral argument,
collective deliberation, and drafting opinions by the judges themselves.165
But, as Professor Henry Monaghan observed a generation ago, “[t]he
litigation explosion carries with it the increasing bureaucratization of the
federal appellate process, a development that severely undermines the

162
If one factors in the 111 senior judges on the regional courts of appeals, that number
increases a bit. Assuming that a senior judge carries fifty percent of the workload of an active
judge, see Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–
2009, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2012), the number becomes about three hours. I obtained the
number of senior circuit judges by using the “Advanced Search Criteria” at Federal Judicial
Center, Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–present,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search [https://perma.cc/3TEV-SAQP]
(last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (filter to include all U.S. courts of appeals except the Federal Circuit
under “Court” and filter by senior status judge under “Limit to Sitting Judges”).
163
See Hart, supra note 154, at 99–100 (“Ideas which will stand the test of time as
instruments for the solution of hard problems do not come even to the most gifted of lawyers
in twenty-four hours.”). Professor Charles Alan Wright wrote in 1964 that, on the courts of
appeals, “80 cases per judge is the greatest number of dispositions which can be reasonably
expected, and may well be too high for the average judge.” Charles Alan Wright, The
Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 Tex. L. Rev. 949, 957 (1964).
We are now at many multiples of that.
164
See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 551 (1969).
165
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 3. Learned Hand died in 1961 and continued to
hear cases until nearly the end. Gunther, supra note 137, at 585.
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institutional premises of the Hart-Hand model.”166 The Learned Hand
Treatment for every appeal is now mostly a wistful fantasy.
As one would expect, the progress of a case through a court of appeals
looks very different now than in Judge Hand’s day. In order to manage
their staggering workload, appellate judges have had to triage appeals.167
Oral argument is heard in less than twenty percent of cases.168 Nearly
ninety percent of appellate opinions are now unpublished.169 A large
(though difficult to quantify) proportion of those opinions are either
unreasoned or affirmed on the basis of the district court’s decision.170
Many of those unreasoned orders would doubtless have warranted full
opinions in an earlier time.171 There is also disturbing empirical evidence
that crowded dockets cause the courts of appeals to affirm at a higher rate,
thus undermining their core function to identify and correct errors in
lower courts (and agencies).172
The situation in district courts is also bleak. In 2020, statistics from the
Judicial Conference indicated that there were 332,732 civil cases filed and

166

Henry Paul Monaghan, Taking Bureaucracy Seriously, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 344, 345 (1985).
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 22, at xii (describing the “Appellate Triage” system).
168
Admin Off. of the U.S. Cts, Table B-10: Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral
Arguments or Submission on Briefs, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2020 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b10_
0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3EQ-QJ44].
169
Admin Off. of the U.S. Cts, Table B-12: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Type of Opinion or
Order Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period
Ending September 30, 2020 (2020, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_ta
bles/jb_b12_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYV7-M3EE].
170
See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 533, 575–82 (2020).
171
See Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years
of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 904 (1987)
(quoting Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts
of Appeals, 37 Fla. L. Rev. 225, 250 (1985)) (“Most federal judges will admit ‘[t]he reality is
that the courts of appeals are silently deciding appeals that twenty years ago would have been
thought to merit a full opinion.’ ”).
172
See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1130–33 (2011); Menell
& Vacca, supra note 155, at 870; see also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge
and Reform 345 (1996) (“[O]ne consequence of the heavy caseload pressures on the courts of
appeals has been an increase in the deference paid by those courts to the rulings made by
district judges.”).
167
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93,213 criminal cases.173 There are 667 authorized judgeships.174 That is
about 639 cases per judge per year. Case terminations have risen about
fivefold since 1970.175 Factoring in new judges, senior judges, magistrate
judges, and case difficulty, district court judge workloads have nearly
doubled in the last fifty years by one measure.176 There are subtleties that
these raw numbers do not capture,177 but it is plain that, when one factors
in the managerial responsibilities (and smaller clerical staff) of district
judges, along with the need to preside over trials, the time for deliberation
and opinion writing is severely limited. In the Supreme Court’s
understated words, “trial judges often must resolve complicated legal
questions without [the] benefit of ‘extended reflection [or] extensive
information.’ ” 178
The upshot of all this is obvious. An important justification of
decisional minimalism, even in the Supreme Court, is limited judicial
capacity and bounded rationality. That justification is substantially more
powerful in lower courts. The time available for reflection and opinion
writing is far scarcer. There is thus added reason to be skeptical that a
wide and deep opinion, ambitiously essaying to clarify the law, will be
successful at both anticipating unknown circumstances and laying down
an effective rule.
There is one immediate objection that one can imagine related to the
courts of appeals: the problem is overstated because circuit judges can
organize their time to only focus their attention on a few opinions a year,
173

Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2020 [https://p
erma.cc/5NUW-EYUS] (last visited Feb. 18, 2022).
174
Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., U.S. District Courts: Additional Authorized Judgeships,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/districtauth.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM37-GXNL]
(last accessed Jan. 22, 2022).
175
Menell & Vacca, supra note 155, at 846.
176
Id. at 848 (“[W]eighted caseloads per judge have climbed 47% based on filings and 90%
based on terminations from 1971 to 2017.”). Case numbers seem to have plateaued in recent
years, however. See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1793, 1825–26, 1826–29
figs.8, 9, 10, 11 & 12 (2014); Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal
District Courts, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1177, 1182–83.
177
Cf. Philip Habel & Kevin Scott, New Measures of Judges’ Caseload for the Federal
District Courts, 1964–2012, 2 J.L. & Cts. 153, 166–68 (2014) (proposing more precise
empirical methods for calculating caseloads in district court).
178
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (quoting Dan T. Coenen, To
Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings
on State Law, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 899, 923 (1989)).
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and those opinions may—perhaps even should—be wide and deep.
Maybe, then, court of appeals judges can be maximalist in a few published
opinions per year, but not the rest. This objection does not hold water.
First, though this is difficult to quantify, it appears that the time
constraints on circuit judges would still be severe as long as they were
giving a minimal level of attention to their other work. The judicial time
spent per case is cut to the bone as it is. It is hard to see how one could
take time spent on other matters to create more time for published
opinions without cutting well into the bone. This is consistent with the
testimony of judges themselves, who have lamented time constraints even
after the practice of unpublished opinions took hold.179
Second, to focus on a few cases for privileged treatment at the expense
of everything else is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the statutes
governing appellate jurisdiction and is normatively problematic. Litigants
have, by statute, the right to an appeal in the federal courts of appeals.180
An appeal as of right “assures litigants that the decision in their case is
not prey to the failings of whichever mortal happened to render it, but
bears the institutional imprimatur and approval of the whole social order
as represented by its legal system.”181 A cursory review by a staff attorney
or law clerk—supplemented by a small chance of winning the lottery and
getting a published opinion—should not be deemed to satisfy a litigant’s
right to an appeal.182 I do not mean to deny the very real workload
constraints that haven driven the courts of appeals to this bifurcated
system. But the remedy should not be the effective conversion of the
courts of appeals into certiorari courts that get to pick their cases.183 In
179

For a particularly harrowing account, see Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s
Bargain: The Federal Courts and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 473, 474 (2009) (noting that courts of appeals “have made a devil’s bargain
to achieve some semblance of order”); see also Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too
Many Cases: A Plea to Save the Federal Courts, 79 A.B.A. J. 52, 52 (1993) (“Those who
believe we are doing the same quality work that we did in the past are simply fooling
themselves.”).
180
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts . . . .”) (emphasis added); see Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1)
(referring to an appeal “as of right”). There are some exceptions, like certain appeals from
habeas petitions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
181
Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador & Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 2 (1976).
182
See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 Duke L.J. 315, 344–54 (2011) (describing the process
of staff attorney review for non-argument dispositions in several circuits).
183
See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 115, 118–19 (arguing that the courts of
appeals have effectively transformed themselves into certiorari courts); Marin K. Levy,
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Judge Richard Arnold’s words, the “remedy” is “to create enough
judgeships to handle the volume” or “for each judge to take enough time
to do a competent job with each case,” even if the result is “backlogs.”184
Adhering to decisional minimalism would allow judges to handle a
greater number of cases competently.185
To urge lower court judges to focus their attention on a few maximalist
published opinions, then, has perverse effects. It leaves judges with less
time for the rest of the docket. That would likely result in more
“subminimalist” dispositions that do not meet the rudiments of procedural
justice.186 That shift would probably most affect the disadvantaged—
prisoners, noncitizens, and pro se litigants—who are less likely to be the
beneficiaries of published opinions.187 Favoring minimalist opinions
would not solve the workload crisis, but it would at least begin to
distribute the scarce resource of judicial attention a little more
equitably.188
Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 Yale L.J. 2386, 2402 (2014) (noting that this “analogy” has
“limitations” but agreeing that “circuit courts have altered the way that they review cases”);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 Fla. L. Rev. 205, 222 (1985) (“A
peremptory judgment without any stated reason bears an uncomfortably close resemblance to
simple rejection of a case as unworthy of review.”).
184
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot en banc,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
185
One empirical assumption of decisional minimalism is that wide and deep opinions take
more time and resources to write, at least if they are competent. See Sunstein, Leaving Things
Undecided, supra note 33, at 16–17. That seems like a fair assumption. A court fashioning a
wide and deep opinion will have to research not only the law but also the theory and history
underlying the law, will have to consider how its holding will apply in other factual scenarios,
and will have to explore how its rule might interact with other bodies of law. See id. at 17. On
a multimember tribunal, it may also be harder to forge consensus with colleagues and to review
colleagues’ draft opinions. Id. at 65. To be sure, a judge could do a quick and cursory job on
a broad and deep opinion. The point, though, is that it takes more time to produce a good
maximalist opinion, and a minimalist opinion will make less consequential errors.
186
Cf. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 33, at 15 (using “subminimalism”
to describe opinions that are “conclusory and opaque, and that offer little in the way of
justification or guidance for the future”); McAlister, supra note 170, at 582–91 (arguing
against unreasoned and unpublished decisions in the courts of appeals).
187
See McAlister, supra note 170, at 536–37, 556 (“[F]or [the] have-nots, the promise of an
appeal as of right has become little more than a rubber stamp . . . .”).
188
Another possible objection is that “maximalist” decisions may alleviate workload
problems by making the resolution of future cases easier. Whether a minimalist resolution will
export “decision costs” to future decision makers is one factor that may inform whether a court
follows a minimalist path in a particular case. See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note
33, at 48. But this does not categorically undercut the case for decisional minimalism in lower
courts, for two reasons. First, decision costs should not be considered in a vacuum.
Minimalism seeks to minimize decision costs and error costs. Given the resource constraints

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Judicial Minimalism in the Lower Courts

865

2. The Quality of Advocacy
A brief note on a related point: judges depend upon information and
arguments presented to them in briefs. The typical brief in the lower
courts is inferior in quality and comprehensiveness to briefing in the
Supreme Court.189 Further, in many cases the Supreme Court gets a range
of amicus briefs from trade associations, public interest organizations,
and scholars specializing in the issues before the Court.190 As a result, the
Supreme Court gets a fuller picture of existing law and the likely effects
of its ruling.191 And even when it does not, the Supreme Court has the
time and resources—between its clerks and dedicated library staff—to do
independent research.
The picture is quite different in the lower courts. The quality of briefing
varies. There is a greater possibility that a party may lose simply by being
out-lawyered, meaning the content of opinions may not reflect the
intrinsic merits of the parties’ positions.192 Amicus briefs are less frequent
in the lower courts than they are in the Supreme Court.193 And there is
less time for independent research. All of these facts about lower court

of lower courts, the likelihood that a broad rule will also be erroneous reinforces the general
case for minimalism. Second, because broader and deeper rules may emerge in lower courts
through a series of minimalist adjudications, it is not necessarily the case that a broad and deep
opinion issued by the first panel to see a complex issue is the best or only way to reduce future
decision costs. See infra notes 269–70 and accompanying text.
189
Bryan A. Garner, Stephen G. Breyer, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing (Special Issue) 145,
160 (2010) (interview with Justice Breyer). But see id. at 51, 54 (interview with Justice Scalia)
(discussing the “specialized” D.C. Circuit bar in “various fields” and denying that Supreme
Court briefs were superior to D.C. Circuit briefs). I suspect the gap has widened since these
interviews were conducted in 2006, with the continued emergence of a specialized Supreme
Court bar. See Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber: At
America’s Court of Last Resort, a Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket, Reuters
(Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/
[https://perma.cc/4ZTV-99KA] (noting that many Justices “welcome” the “growing
specialization of the Supreme Court bar” because it “help[s] them understand and sift through
complex legal issues”).
190
See Bruhl, supra note 18, at 470–71.
191
See Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1901,
1952–57 (2016) (arguing that amicus briefs help the Court declare “broad legal rules”).
192
See Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and
Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 235, 253 (1992) (“The
parties that may be presumed to have superior litigation resources consistently fared better [in
the courts of appeals] than their weaker opponents, and the disparity in success rates was
greatest when the disparity in strength was greatest.”); Ashlyn K. Kuersten & Donald R.
Songer, Decisions on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 188–89 (2001) (similar).
193
Bruhl, supra note 18, at 472; Kuersten & Songer, supra note 192, at 186.
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practice counsel in favor of narrower and shallower rulings that avoid
forays into areas where the briefs provide dim or unhelpful
illumination.194
3. Rules of Precedent
The approach to precedent followed by the courts of appeals is another
strong reason to favor decisional minimalism there. Every circuit adheres
to the same basic rule: a decision by one panel on a question of law is
binding on all subsequent panels, barring some intervention by a higher
authority (like a Supreme Court decision, an en banc decision, or a law of
Congress).195 That is a more rigid rule than exists in the Supreme Court
and delegates considerable power to the first panel to consider an issue.
Once that first panel resolves an issue of law, it is the “law of the circuit”
and can only be changed by going en banc.196 Going en banc is a rare and
cumbersome process. The en banc standard is similar to the certiorari
standard,197 and en banc review is granted in a tiny fraction of cases.198
Indeed, it is even rarer than certiorari: in the twelve-month period ending
in September 2020, only forty cases were decided en banc in all the
regional circuits combined.199
The rigidity of stare decisis in the courts of appeals bolsters the case
for decisional minimalism. Once a panel decides an issue, future panels
are stuck with that decision unless the circuit goes en banc or a lightning
194
See Peters, supra note 43, at 1514–20 (defending decisional minimalism in the Supreme
Court based on the adversarial nature of the judicial system and judicial competence).
195
See Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 685, 721 (2000). The panel precedent rule is of
surprisingly recent vintage: it developed in the courts of appeals in the second half of the
twentieth century. See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 1011, 1066 n.214 (2003).
196
Cooper & Berman, supra note 195, at 739. Some circuits have procedures by which a
panel opinion can be overruled by another panel if the latter panel circulates its draft opinion
to the full court and either every judge or a majority of judges accedes. Barrett, supra note
195, at 1045 n.136. This happens in a very small number of cases relative to the courts of
appeals’ total docket. Id.; Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and
the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 713, 726–
28 (2009) (charting the frequency of informal en bancs).
197
Compare Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (stating the standard for rehearing en banc), with S. Ct.
R. 10 (stating the certiorari standard).
198
Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating Judicial Attention, 73 Vand. L. Rev.
605, 608 (2020) (“The courts [of appeals] now review a mere 0.19% of decisions en
banc . . . .”).
199
Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., supra note 168, at Table B-10.
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bolt strikes from the Supreme Court. Further, the panel’s decision will
effectively resolve the issue for persons subject to the circuit’s jurisdiction
even if they are not in litigation. To put it in Sunstein’s terms, the “error
costs” of a wrong decision are thus very high. In these circumstances, and
especially when paired with the capacity constraints highlighted above, it
makes eminent sense for a panel to proceed cautiously and to favor
narrow and shallow dispositions.
One possible counterargument is that the rigidity of stare decisis is
softened in practice by a subsequent panel’s ability to distinguish prior
precedents or recharacterize assertions as dicta. That does not solve the
problem. It is of course true that the apparent hard edges of some holdings
may prove porous on close inspection. But it is a non sequitur to move
from this porosity in edge cases to the proposition that precedent has no
constraining force.200 To take a metaphor from everyday life, it may be
possible to ignore a stop sign and drive through it without slowing, but
that possibility does not mean a stop sign does not have a significant effect
on behavior.201 Even a dyed-in-the-wool Realist like Professor Karl
Llewellyn acknowledged that judges are “law-conditioned” officials,
which means that legal doctrine “is to control the deciding” of cases
where there is “no real room for doubt” and still “guide[s]” decision
where there is room for doubt.202 Further, even if a panel precedent may
be distinguishable in cases that come back to the court of appeals, that
does not mean that it does not have a significant constraining effect on
innumerable cases that never make it to litigation at all.203
200

Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 410–11 (1985).
Id. at 424.
202
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 19–20 (1960); see
also Barrett, supra note 195, at 1023 (“[N]either judges nor litigants behave as if precedent
were meaningless.”).
203
See Schauer, supra note 200, at 422–23. I would add, though, that the rigidity of the panel
precedent rule furnishes a good reason to attend carefully to the distinction between holding
and dicta. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1249, 1250 (2006) (urging judges not to disregard the distinction between holding and
dictum). As Judge Friendly once observed, “[a] judge’s power to bind is limited to the issue
that is before him; he cannot transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering
the word ‘hold.’” United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.,
concurring). Indeed, the minimalism or maximalism of a decision is, to an extent, constituted
by how that opinion is read by future judges. See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra
note 33, at 25–26. That means a court of appeals panel (and even a district judge) might
enforce a norm of minimalism by reading a panel precedent “minimally” ex post. This point
could be broadened: non-judicial officials, other members of the legal community, and the
broader public could, to some extent, enforce a norm of judicial minimalism by reading
201
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The situation in district courts is more mixed. As a formal matter,
district court decisions do not create binding precedent.204 That is, other
district courts within the same district are not obliged to follow prior
decisions by other district courts on questions of law, although those prior
decisions may be persuasive (and often are, to a time-strapped judge). On
the one hand, that feature of district court decisions shows why
minimalism makes eminent sense: a district court is predominately an
enforcement court, tethered to the circumstances of the parties before it,
and an ambitious attempt to clarify the law for non-parties is not worth
the candle.
On the other hand, one could argue that the lack of precedential effect
means that the imperative of narrow and shallow decisions is not as urgent
in district courts as it is in the courts of appeals. But the imperative is not
empty: to discount entirely the importance of district court decisions of
law because they lack formal stare decisis effect would be to miss some
important, if subtle, dimensions of such decisions.
First, “[a]s a practical matter, we know that many trial court
rulings . . . do influence conduct, as indications of the likely behavior of
courts in future cases.”205 District court rulings can thus function as
de facto precedents. Second, a district court ruling can have dramatic and
immediate real-world effects. A decision striking down a law on its face
and enjoining its operation nationwide, for instance, can establish the
practical law of the land while appellate review is unfolding.206 A
narrower ruling would have a more circumscribed real-world effect.207

opinions “minimally,” either based on the departmentalist view that only a court’s judgment
is legally binding, see William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J. 1807, 1844 (2008),
or simply by attending to the holding/dictum distinction as suggested above.
204
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011); John Harrison, The Power of Congress
over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L.J. 503, 518 (2000). As with many generalities about
district court procedure, there seem to be some variations in individual judges’ practices. See
Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 Nev. L.J. 787,
800–04 (2012).
205
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016, 1057 (2004).
206
One district court’s nationwide injunction against President Trump’s second travel ban,
for example, effectively determined the travel ban’s status until the Ninth Circuit’s denial of
the government’s stay three months later and the Supreme Court’s partial stay after that. See
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083–85, 2089 (2017) (per
curiam).
207
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 Calif. L. Rev.
915, 923–24 n.31 (2011) (arguing that the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges
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Third, a district court’s resolution of an issue of law generally serves as
the “law of the case” going forward until appeal.208 In many cases, the
district court’s initial ruling furnishes the final and operative rules to the
parties in the case because they settle, do not appeal, or enter into a
consent decree on the basis of that ruling. And the law of the case may
undergird any number of managerial decisions of the district court that
can have a significant impact on the parties and how the legal issues are
framed on appeal.209 Finally, the district court’s opinion may have a
meaningful impact on the parties themselves; indeed, the parties are the
intended audience of a trial court opinion to a greater extent than they are
of an appellate court opinion.210 A minimalist opinion may, in the
language of procedural justice, respect the dignity or sense of fairness of
the losing litigant by stopping short of a broad and deep repudiation of a
strongly held conviction.211 Put another way, a minimalist district court
decision will be less “jurispathic” to the losing party; it will dispense a
loss without squashing as much of the losing party’s normative world as
a broader decision might.212
In sum, the law of the circuit rule, by which the first panel to decide an
issue sets down the rule which all subsequent panels must follow unless

in district courts should be thought of in terms of breadth and narrowness and preclusive
effect).
208
See Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 840 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J.) (“Law of the case doctrine permits a court to decline the invitation to reconsider
issues already resolved earlier in the life of a litigation.”). Not every commentator and court
agrees that “law of the case” is the right label for a district court’s reluctance to reconsider its
rulings before final judgment. See 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.1 (2d ed. 2002). But it is a common and useful
shorthand. Id. It is also not a limit on a district court’s power to reconsider if circumstances
warrant; rather, it “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what
has been decided.” Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b).
209
See Ahdout, supra note 22, at 942–43; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 374, 378 (1982); Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts,
53 Vill. L. Rev. 973, 978 (2008).
210
See David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in
Common Law Theory 134, 148–49 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
211
Cf. id. (noting that a judge’s “statement of reasons” respects “the dignitary values of the
person”). Indeed, some social science work suggests that “in civil cases, defendants rate
mediation to be fairer than a formal trial.” Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and
Procedure, 35 Int’l J. Psych. 117, 121 (2000); see also id. at 122 (noting that procedural justice
is enhanced when authorities “make clear that they have listened to and considered the
arguments made” and respect disputants’ dignity).
212
See Greene, supra note 43, at 647 (quoting Cover, supra note 44, at 40).
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overturned by a higher authority, provides strong support for decisional
minimalism in the courts of appeals. As for district courts, on the one
hand, the lack of formal precedential effect makes minimalism somewhat
less compelling at that level relative to appellate courts; on the other hand,
district court decisions have a host of practical effects that make
decisional minimalism a valuable and important goal in light of other
elements of the case for minimalism discussed in this Part.
4. Size and Voting Rules
A defining feature of the Supreme Court is that it is a single, large,
multimember body. Assuming no recusals or vacancies, a majority
opinion must win five votes to attain the force of law.213 The Court’s size
conduces to collective deliberation, full ventilation of legal issues, and
some moderation in the final outcome.214 As Justice Cardozo memorably
put it, “out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something
which has a constancy and uniformity and average value greater than its
component elements.”215 In contrast to the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeals sit in panels of three, selected more or less at random.216 District
213

An opinion with fewer than five votes may sometimes have the force of law when the
Court splinters. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It
is notable that, even there, the bias of the system is toward “narrow[ness].” Id. On the many
complexities of the Marks rule, see generally Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132
Harv. L. Rev. 1942 (2019).
214
See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82,
83 (1986) (arguing that “enlarging the number of judges who sit on a court can be expected to
improve the court’s performance”); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms
on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297, 2310–11 (1999) (“The process of collective
deliberation can improve autonomous decisionmaking.”).
215
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 177 (1921).
216
Interestingly, neither the statute nor the Rules of Appellate Procedure specify how panels
should be populated, so the task is handled either by chief judges or court staff, depending
upon the circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 46; Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 65, 75–76 (2017). There are some deviations from strict
randomness to equalize workloads, to accommodate schedules, to reassign returning cases to
the panel that originally heard them, and a few other considerations. Id. at 81–93; see Adam
S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2015); Matthew Hall, Randomness
Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 7 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 574, 578–79 (2010). Those small deviations, which do not appear to
have any ideological motivation, Levy, supra, at 68, do not affect my basic argument here.
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judges, by and large, are randomly assigned to cases and act alone.217
These differences make decisional minimalism more important as a
conscious goal to pursue in the lower courts.
It will likely not come as a surprise that “there is a large body of
empirical research that suggests that the ideological composition of threejudge panels has an effect on case outcomes (with ideology being defined
by the party of the appointing president).”218 The effects are most
pronounced when a panel contains either three Democratic appointees or
Republican appointees, although they are still significant on mixed
panels.219 Decisional minimalism is a strategy to cabin the effects of
random panel variation. By definition, a maximalist opinion announces a
broad and deep rule that is likely to impact other cases. The content of
such a broad rule should not be determined by the happenstance of who
is assigned to a panel. Sudden and significant legal change based on that
sort of fortuity corrodes at least the perception of an impersonal rule of
law.220 And the problem is exacerbated by the rigid rule of stare decisis in
217

District judge assignment rules are even more obscure and varied than assignment rules
in the courts of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 137(a) (delegating authority to create rules of case
assignment to individual courts). But the “majority of courts use some variation of a random
drawing.” FAQs: Filing a Case, Admin. Off. U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filingcase [https://perma.cc/3TJ2-27XM] (last visited Feb. 18, 2022); see, e.g., D.D.C. Local Civ.
R. 40.3(a) (“[C]ases shall be assigned to judges of this Court selected at random . . . .”). For
an overview of district court case assignment procedures, see Alex Botoman, Note, Divisional
Judge-Shopping, 49 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., Winter 2018, at 297, 308–20. As I discuss
below, the case assignment process can be manipulated in troubling ways. See infra
Subsection III.B.2.
218
Levy, supra note 216, at 101 n.189; see also Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M.
Ellman & Andrew Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal
Judiciary 11 (2006) (“[V]ariations in panel composition lead to dramatically different
outcomes, in a way that creates serious problems for the rule of law.”); Stephen B. Burbank
& Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Pleading Decisions on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 169
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2127, 2146 (2021) (“By now it will surprise few people that measures of judge
ideology based, in whole or in part, on party of appointing president are associated with
decision-making on the Courts of Appeals.”); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial
Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 300 (2005) (“[S]tudy after study . . . makes equally clear that
ideology plays a role in lower court decisions.”); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition
and Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals over Time, 64 Pol. Rsch. Q. 377, 387 (2011) (finding
that a “meaningful relationship between panel composition and panel outcomes” emerged in
the mid-1980s).
219
Sunstein et al., supra note 218, at 11–12; see also Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717, 1719 (1997) (finding, based
on a study of environmental law cases in the D.C. Circuit, that a judge’s individual vote is
“greatly affected by the identity of the other judges sitting on the panel”).
220
Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 781
(1989) (“The ideal of ‘the rule of law, not of men’ calls upon us to strive to ensure that our
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the courts of appeals: a random panel composed of three ideologically
aligned judges has the formal power to issue a broad holding that will then
bind all future panels. A norm of decisional minimalism would counteract
this temptation.
The situation is intensified in district courts. Because district judges act
alone in almost all cases, they do not need to persuade any colleagues to
take far-reaching actions—like a nationwide injunction against a
government policy—based on an idiosyncratic view of the law.221 Of
course, the threat of reversal will exert some moderating force. But a
district court’s order can have dramatic effects before there is time for
appellate review,222 when a large proportion of a district court’s orders in
the course of a case are not subject to effective appellate review at all,223
and when the final-judgment rule means that appellate review will often
be so delayed as to be practically valueless for some parties.224 Many
parties will settle based on a district judge’s erroneous view of the law
rather than chance an appellate reversal several years in the future. Like
the courts of appeals, then, the possibility of a maximalist and outlier
ruling from a district court judge based on a random case assignment
militates strongly in favor of a norm of decisional minimalism.225

law itself will rule (govern) us, not the wishes of powerful individuals.”); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2–3
(1997) (noting the foundational distinction in American legal discourse between the rule of
law and the rule of individuals).
221
Empirical study of district court decision making is complicated by the fact that so much
of what district courts do is not visible in reported decisions. See Christina L. Boyd, Pauline
T. Kim & Margo Schlanger, Mapping the Iceberg: The Impact of Data Sources on the Study
of District Courts, 17 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 466, 467–69 (2020).
222
See supra note 206.
223
See Resnik, supra note 209, at 378 (“Managerial judges frequently work . . . out of reach
of appellate review.”).
224
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (generally confining appeals to “final decisions of the district
courts”).
225
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau rested on a similar skepticism of a single individual wielding too much
power. 140 S. Ct. 2183 at 2203–04 (2020). The Court held that an independent agency with a
single director (rather than a multimember board) was unconstitutional because a single
director could “dictate and enforce policy for a vital segment of the economy affecting millions
of Americans” without having to “persuade” any colleagues to go along. Id. at 2204. ThenJudge Kavanaugh had written in a related case that a multimember board, with “its inherent
requirement for compromise and consensus,” will “tend to lead to decisions that are not as
extreme, idiosyncratic, or otherwise off the rails.” PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 184 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). If we are concerned about a single,
independent director “dictat[ing] and enforc[ing] policy,” we should be concerned about
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5. Case Selection
The Supreme Court’s docket is almost totally discretionary. With a few
narrow exceptions, it has complete control over which cases it hears
through certiorari.226 And it exercises that discretion sparingly; in the
2020 Term, it gave plenary review to only fifty-seven cases.227 The
jurisdiction of the lower courts, by contrast, is almost entirely mandatory;
they have no formal version of certiorari to allow them to refuse to
adjudicate a case properly before them.228 This difference, too, bears on
the case for decisional minimalism.
First, the lower courts cannot so easily wriggle out of deciding cases
that they would prefer not to hear—whether because they are politically
explosive, because the political, social, or technological circumstances
are changing rapidly, or because they are unsure how the case should be
resolved.229 As a result, the best a lower court can do is resolve a case in
a manner that does not resolve more than necessary. Second, as will be
explored more fully below, because the Supreme Court hears so few
cases, it must often issue wide opinions to adequately perform its
guidance function.230 A narrow opinion that resolves little more than the
case at hand is an inefficient use of a limited certiorari docket (as the
criteria for certiorari reflect).231 Lower courts, however, can discharge the
guidance function in a different manner. Because they decide so many
more cases than the Supreme Court, they can clarify the law in a more

single judges and small, randomized panels with a similar power. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at
2204.
226
28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257.
227
Supra note 24.
228
Lower courts may have some discretion to control what they decide, but their discretion
is different in kind from certiorari. See infra notes 298–305 and accompanying text. There are
a few small pockets of cases where the courts of appeals have a certiorari-like discretion,
including appeals of class certification decisions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)
and interlocutory appeals certified by the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
229
Put another way, they have less room for prudential minimalism. See infra Section II.C.
230
Cf. Schauer, supra note 38, at 208 (arguing that “[g]uidance and minimalism are thus
opposing virtues” in the Supreme Court); Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Discretionary Dockets, 31 Const. Comment. 221, 247 (2016) (“A court that speaks both rarely
and guardedly fails to provide the requisite clarity and certainty regarding the content of
constitutional norms.”).
231
See S. Ct. R. 10 (indicating that certiorari is generally confined to “important” issues);
infra note 341 and accompanying text.
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classic, common law fashion by deciding a large number of cases
narrowly and incrementally.232
One last point warrants discussion. The paradigmatic instance of
judicial review in the public imagination (which underlies the countermajoritarian difficulty) is a challenge in the Supreme Court to a legislative
act. But judicial review in lower courts tends to look different. As
Professor Seth Kreimer has shown, the “Constitution in action at the trial
court level most frequently involves damage actions seeking to invoke
protections of minimal civil decency against street-level bureaucrats who
exercise delegated discretion.”233 In this kind of case, the Supreme Court
enunciates broad doctrinal standards—“deliberate indifference,”
“legitimate expectations,” unreasonable use of force, and the like—and
the lower courts give those standards life and specificity in particular
disputes.234 As a result, the role of district courts in much constitutional
litigation “differs importantly from that of the seekers of neutral
principles, the strivers for social aspiration and prophecy, or the
archaeologists of historical intention that appear in most constitutional
theory.”235 Instead they give Supreme Court doctrine “the reality of
justice through repeated application.”236 That task is fundamentally
minimalist.
6. Democratic Legitimacy
Democratic legitimacy is a complex concept that is usually used in one
of two senses: aggregative or deliberative.237 The aggregative concept of
democracy is that governance is legitimate to the extent that policy
decisions are made by voters or those for whom the voters voted.238 The
232

See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 230, at 244; Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured
Constitutional Steps, 71 Ind. L.J. 297, 353 (1996).
233
Kreimer, supra note 153, at 432.
234
Id. at 463.
235
Id. at 516.
236
Id. at 519 n.221.
237
Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration and Democratic Legitimacy: How
Administrative Law Supports Democratic Government 165–70 (2018); see also Fabienne
Peter, Democratic Legitimacy 1 (2009) (calling “aggregative and deliberative democracy” the
“two main paradigms” in “contemporary democratic theory”).
238
Mashaw, supra note 237, at 165. Bickel’s counter-majoritarian difficulty is premised on
this concept of democratic legitimacy. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34, at
16–17; see also Waldron, supra note 140, at 1386–93 (assessing the relative legitimacy of
courts and legislatures in similar terms). On the Framers’ complex relationship to democracy,
see David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127
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deliberative concept of democracy “situates the legitimacy of political
decision-making not in elections, but in the process of public deliberation
between free and equal citizens.”239 The theory of decisional minimalism
rests on both ideas of democracy: minimalism is democracy-permitting,
and therefore good, because it “allows the democratic process a great deal
of room.”240 But it is also good because, through techniques like void-forvagueness and constitutional avoidance, it “can provide spurs and prods
to promote democratic deliberation itself.”241 How do these democratic
justifications fare in the lower courts?
From the perspective of aggregative democracy, the House and Senate
are democratically legitimate because they are elected by the people and
must face periodic reelection. The executive branch is legitimate relative
to the judiciary because the President is elected, and high-level officials
are nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and generally
accountable to the President.242 When an administration ends, a new
administration takes office that tends to reflect the policies of the new
President.243 The judiciary, on this scale, is the least democratically
legitimate. Though judges are appointed by the President with the consent
of the Senate, they have life tenure. As a result, a judge’s connection to
democratic politics in the appointment process may have occurred long
in the past, and judges do not face reelection. Hence the appeal of
decisional minimalism: it forecloses fewer policy options to the more
democratically legitimate branches of government.
This justification for minimalism is stronger in the context of lower
courts. Supreme Court Justices have a stronger claim to “aggregative”
democratic legitimacy than lower court judges because so much more
political attention is lavished on the Supreme Court appointment process.
Indeed, some have pointed to the “democratic pedigree” of the Supreme
Yale L.J. 664, 677–81 (2018) (reviewing Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The
Invention of Modern Democracy (2016)).
239
Mashaw, supra note 237, at 167; see Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 24–
25 (“[I]n a deliberative democracy, a premium is also placed on the exchange of reasons by
people with different information and diverse perspectives.”).
240
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 53.
241
Id. at 27.
242
Mashaw, supra note 237, at 170. One could, of course, agree that the executive branch
has more democratic legitimacy than the judiciary without agreeing that it is legitimate full
stop. See id.; Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 Harv. L.
Rev. 718, 718–19 (2016) (reviewing Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The
Administrative State Emerges in America, 1900–1940 (2014)).
243
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
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Court as a way to undercut the premises of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty.244 But the democratic pedigrees of Justices and judges differ.
To be sure, they go through the same formal process of nomination and
confirmation.245 In practice, however, a President will devote more time
to picking a Justice than to picking a lower court judge. After all, that
Justice will likely project the President’s legacy far into the future, and so
the President will take care to select someone whose constitutional vision
is reasonably consonant with her own.246 Second, a nominee for Supreme
Court Justice will receive closer scrutiny from the Senate, outside groups,
and the public at large than a nominee to a lower court will receive.247 It
is hard to imagine anything like the high drama and public salience of the
Bork confirmation hearing in the case of a court of appeals judge, let alone
a district judge. As a result, lower court judges typically have a less
compelling claim to a “democratic pedigree” than Supreme Court
Justices. And the case for democracy-permitting minimalism is
accordingly stronger.248

244

See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government 64–65 (2001).
See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 221 (1985) (noting the “structural parity” of all
Article III judges).
246
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 284 (1957) (“Presidents are not famous for appointing
[J]ustices hostile to their own views on public policy . . . .”); see Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A.
Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments 50–52 (2005); Barack
Obama, A Responsibility I Take Seriously, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 24, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/a-responsibility-i-take-seriously/ [https://perma.cc/R3
N7-3KNZ].
247
Bruhl, supra note 18, at 488; see Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice and
Dissent: The Struggle to Shape the Federal Judiciary 2 (2009) (“[A] typical nomination to the
lower federal courts receives far less scrutiny than would a nomination to the Supreme
Court.”).
248
There is one respect in which district judges may have a superior democratic pedigree:
they “have special ties to local constituencies, which may afford them special leeway in their
own communities.” Bruhl, supra note 18, at 491; see also Emily Buss, The Divisive Supreme
Court, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 44 (noting the “distinctly local pedigrees” of many district
judges); Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial
Courts, 43 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 971, 1013 (2010) (“[T]rial judges are generally understood
to be cognizant of, and often expected to be responsive to, local sensibilities.”). In public law
cases, however, lower court judges will generally be interpreting federal statutes and
constitutional provisions and thus engaged largely in discerning national policies—especially
when the endgame is nationwide relief. And district court judges “have a lesser claim, as
compared to Supreme Court Justices, to have been democratically authorized to make national
policy.” Bruhl, supra note 18, at 491 (emphasis omitted).
245
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There is another, subtler facet of aggregative legitimacy on the lower
courts. The Justices decide cases as a single, unified body that does not
change without a resignation and appointment.249 The Court thus deepens
the temporality of representation in a relatively constant way. It
aggregates the choices and priorities of the past several presidents and
Senates.250 Though chance and Justices’ retirement decisions
unquestionably play an important role, a party that controls the presidency
for long stretches of time will tend to have more opportunities for
appointments to the Court. These political dynamics and the fact that the
Court is a single, continuing body tend to ensure that the median Justice
is, on any particular issue, not terribly far from the legal mainstream.251
These mechanisms are, of course, far from perfect.252 But there is an even
greater danger of unrepresentative decision making in the lower courts.
Because (for the most part) an appellate panel is randomly assembled and
a district judge is randomly assigned, there is no structural guarantee that
there will not be a very large disconnect between the ideological leanings
of a panel or judge and the median voter. Decisional minimalism would
serve to temper this legitimacy problem by confining the effects of the
resulting decision to a smaller compass.
The case for decisional minimalism based on deliberative democracy,
however, is a different story. As noted above, Sunstein also lauds the
capacity of some minimalist dispositions, like invalidating a statute on
void-for-vagueness grounds, to spur activity in the political branches. As
a general matter, this defense of minimalism seems less compelling in the
lower courts for two reasons. First, many lower court decisions are less
visible, and there is no guarantee that the political branches will take
249
There are certain motions and applications that are presented, in the first instance, to
individual Justices, who have the power to act on them alone. S. Ct. R. 22. But even there, the
individual Justice can be overridden by the Court as a whole, and as a practical matter, the
individual Justices will refer controversial applications to the whole Court. See Stephen M.
Shapiro, Kenneth S. Geller, Timothy S. Bishop, Edward A. Hartnett & Dan Himmelfarb,
Supreme Court Practice 17-29 (11th ed. 2019).
250
See Michael W. McConnell, What Are The Judiciary’s Politics?, 45 Pepp. L. Rev. 455,
462–66 (2018).
251
This tendency has been descriptively plausible for much of American history. See Barry
Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court
and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 14 (2009) (“[O]ver time . . . Supreme Court
decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment of the American people.”); Daryl J.
Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law,
130 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 61 (2016) (“[T]he empirical reality appears to be that the Court will
rarely drift very far from the agenda of a dominant national political coalition.”).
252
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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notice of their work.253 Indeed, Congress “tends to give little attention to
the large number of statutory opinions of the lower courts.”254 If Congress
is unaware of a lower court decision, then the decision cannot effectively
provoke a response. Second, as Professor Vermeule has observed, the
lower judiciary is a “they,” not an “it.”255 Because of the lower judiciary’s
collective character, “[i]f judges cannot coordinate on a particular
democracy-forcing regime, then decisions by individual judges in
accordance with democracy-forcing precepts will be futile, perhaps even
perverse.”256 Such decisions would be “futile” because Congress is
unlikely to be “forced” into action by isolated decisions, and they would
be “perverse” because they might distort the law to elicit a congressional
response without actually obtaining that offsetting benefit.257
In short, the democratic case for decisional minimalism in the lower
courts, relative to the Supreme Court, is something of a mixed bag. From
the point of view of aggregative democracy, the case is stronger: lower
court judges have an inferior claim to legitimacy, and the case-assignment
system makes outlier judges and panels real possibilities. From the point
of view of deliberative democracy, the capacity of lower courts to spur
the political branches into deliberation is arguably weaker. That said, in
many salient disputes of public law, the political branches may in fact be
paying close attention to the lower courts, meaning the lower courts are
still capable of provoking dialogue. And lower courts can still themselves

253
See Barrett, supra note 19, at 331–35 (surveying the literature); Victoria F. Nourse,
Response, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 205, 209 (2014) (“Supreme Court
decisions are also visible to the public—and voters—in a way that appellate decisions
generally are not.”).
254
Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 637, 685 (2012); see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331,
416 (1991) (“Just as the present study shows impressive congressional activity in connection
with Supreme Court decisions, it shows an unimpressive knowledge of and response to the far
more numerous lower federal court statutory interpretation decisions.”); Robert A. Katzmann,
Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political
Theory, 80 Geo. L.J. 653, 662 (1992) (finding, based on a small study, that congressional
staffs were not even aware of twelve of fifteen statutory D.C. Circuit decisions warranting
congressional attention).
255
Vermeule, supra note 139, at 118–19.
256
Id. at 118.
257
Id. at 133–37. Vermeule’s point does not undercut the case for decisional minimalism
more broadly. His objection only “bites against interpretive accounts that explicitly or
implicitly require coordinated judicial action.” Id. at 124. Minimalism’s benefits, for the most
part, do not depend on coordination. Any given instance of minimalism will have the benefit
of reduced decision and error costs, as well as reduced interference with the political branches.
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embody deliberative ideals of public reason in their opinions, apart from
provoking activities in other branches. On balance, the democratic case
for minimalism seems to be stronger in lower courts and, at worst, neutral
relative to the Supreme Court.258
B. Some Objections
One common objection to judicial minimalism is that it undersells the
capacity of courts to achieve change for the good. This might be called
the “judicial heroism” critique: that courts can and should step in to
protect marginalized people or to guard important rights. “Had
citizens . . . heeded minimalism’s counsel in the past,” the argument goes,
“there would have been no Brown or Frontiero.”259 And “[t]o adopt
minimalist premises now is to foreswear such decisions in the [future].”260
Professor Justin Driver has added that judicial minimalism borrows
certain rhetorical tropes common among reactionary counterarguments to
progressive change, tropes that were catalogued by Albert Hirschman.261
The rhetorical overlap does not mean that the case for judicial minimalism
is wrong, but it may “instill an unduly anemic understanding of the
Supreme Court’s capacity to promote social change.”262

258

In addition, the same thing that makes lower courts less likely to provoke democratic
deliberation may actually weaken one objection to judicial minimalism too. Professors Robert
Post and Reva Siegel have argued that maximalist Supreme Court opinions can galvanize
popular movements that invigorate and shape our constitutional law. Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
373, 401–06 (2007). In that way, even backlash can reinforce constitutional legitimacy. Id.
But the relative invisibility of lower court opinions deflates that objection as applied to lower
court minimalism.
259
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in The Constitution in
2020, at 25, 33 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
260
Id.
261
See Justin Driver, Reactionary Rhetoric and Liberal Legal Academia, 123 Yale L.J. 2616,
2631 (2014). The tropes are as follows: perversity (that a proposed reform will worsen the
very thing it purports to improve), futility (that reform efforts cannot change fundamental
social conditions that give rise to the targeted injustice or inequality), and jeopardy (that
reform will endanger some prior and more important public value). Id. at 2622–25. See
generally Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy 7
(1991) (cataloguing these three “reactive-reactionary theses”). Professors James Fleming and
Linda McClain have also linked Sunstein’s minimalism and Hirschman’s rhetoric of reaction.
See James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and
Virtues 232 (2013).
262
Driver, supra note 261, at 2637; see also Kate Andrias, The Fortification of Inequality:
Constitutional Doctrine and the Political Economy, 93 Ind. L.J. 5, 25 (2018) (arguing that
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The heroism critique rests on an undeniably appealing vision of judicial
power, but the critique has less bite in the context of lower courts. After
all, Brown v. Board of Education and Frontiero v. Richardson were
Supreme Court cases.263 To embrace judicial minimalism in the lower
courts is not necessarily to deny that the Supreme Court may, and perhaps
should, “quicken the conscience of the nation” when the occasion
demands.264 It just assigns the lower courts a more modest role. By and
large, they dispense justice on a smaller scale.265 Indeed, given the stark
congestion of lower court dockets, reining in judicial ambition may have
the happy effect of allowing lower courts to dispense justice more
equitably to more people. Nor does lower court minimalism mean that
lower courts cannot move the law in a better direction. It is only a question
of how—a minimalist urges lower courts to advance the law in
“molecular” rather than “molar” motions, to use Justice Holmes’s
metaphor.266 In all, lower court minimalism preserves room for bold
action by the Supreme Court and does not rule out “creative, important
judicial contributions” from lower courts that are suited to their
institutional position.267

“judicial minimalism” has “encouraged liberal justices, wary of judicial activism, to acquiesce
to legislation and common law rules that promote inequality”).
263
They may also have been more minimalist than is commonly appreciated. On Frontiero,
see Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1204. As for Brown, it was the culmination of a litigation
campaign that had chipped away at Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), until it collapsed.
In a 1950 speech, Thurgood Marshall said that “[t]he true liberal believes that it is important
to use all of our legal machinery to correct the evils now present,” and that “[o]ur legal
machinery requires a step by step procedure.” Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, NAACP,
Significance of the Recent Supreme Court Decisions, Speech at Fisk University (July 5, 1950),
quoted in Robert Post, Marshall as a Judge, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 7 (2019).
264
Alexander M. Bickel, Integration: The Second Year in Perspective, 135 New Republic,
Oct. 8, 1956, at 12.
265
Even this more modest role, which would include enforcing bold mandates from the
Supreme Court, can take tremendous fortitude. Consider Judge Wright’s heroic efforts to
enforce the Brown decision in a deeply hostile New Orleans in the 1950s. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Greatness in a Lower Federal Court Judge: The Case of J. Skelly Wright, 61 Loy.
L. Rev. 29, 33–36 (2015).
266
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Grey, supra
note 51, at 35.
267
Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1209; Fallon, supra note 265, at 56 (“We should probably be
grateful that most lower-court judges would not even aspire to greatness.”). It may also be
worth asking whom judicial heroism in the lower courts is most likely to serve, given the
makeup of the federal judiciary. See McConnell, supra note 250, at 458 (noting that the federal
judiciary “has always been richer, older, whiter, maler, more secular, and more prominent and
successful than the American population as a whole” (citing Jonathan K. Stubbs, A
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A second objection is that a norm of minimalism would truncate the
law-development process. Case law in the courts of appeals and district
courts (the argument goes) would collapse into a mess of pointillistic
rulings that do little to provide guidance to the parties or to further the
reasoned elaboration of the law.268 As I will explain below, this objection
has force when applied to the Supreme Court, given the Court’s severely
limited docket. But it is defanged by the size of dockets in the lower
courts. A large docket generally allows the law to emerge through
repeated, incremental interventions.269 The Supreme Court’s decisions are
a few, distant points in a constellation; lower court decisions—even
narrow ones—can form a rich, pixelated image if they are numerous
enough. Further, after a period of doctrinal development through frequent
and narrow rulings, a minimalist court may have the “confidence” to
consummate that development by articulating the wider and deeper rule
that has emerged from the bottom up.270 That is a variation of the more
general point that minimalism is a “mood” or “presumption,” not an
ironclad rule, and any departures must be judged on the merits.271
Another version of this second objection is that a few broad and deep
opinions from select lower court judges may be beneficial to get “big”
ideas out there for the Supreme Court to consider. To use a common
metaphor, perhaps a few maximalist opinions could aid the “percolation”
of legal issues in the federal system.272 This potential benefit seems to me
Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments by Sex and Race: 1789–2016, 26
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 92, 109–12 (2016))).
268
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1177
(1989) (rejecting the theory by which “law grows and develops . . . not through the
pronouncement of general principles, but case-by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-stepat-a-time”).
269
See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 230, at 238–39, 244. And it is not clear that
numerous non-minimalist opinions in lower courts would in fact produce greater clarity and
integrity rather than a maximalist cacophony.
270
See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 59. Decisional minimalism in
qualified immunity cases gives rise to a unique pathology. Because an officer can only be
liable if the law was “clearly established” at the time of the conduct in question, a court
adjudicating a qualified immunity case always has the option of denying relief on the relatively
narrow ground that a right was not “clearly established” without addressing whether the right
does in fact exist. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If judges always
followed that minimalist course, it would halt “the development of constitutional precedent.”
Id. For that reason, decisional minimalism should not be a general goal in that context, even
in lower courts.
271
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 33, at 257.
272
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have in
many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of
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overstated. First, it is far from clear that the same big ideas could not come
to the Supreme Court from the parties’ briefs, from amicus briefs, and
from scholarship—to say nothing of social movements and constitutional
culture.273 And the percolation metaphor may overestimate the extent to
which Justices actually pay attention to lower court opinions.274 Second,
to permit certain prominent judges to exempt themselves from a norm of
minimalism would likely end up just defeating the norm; there would no
effective way to control which judges become self-appointed producers
of big ideas. Further, non-minimalist lower court decisions may harm the
Supreme Court’s decisional process because a broad and consequential
mistake may compel the Court to grant certiorari before it would
otherwise do so, effectively undermining the Court’s prudential discretion
over its docket.
A third objection is that a strong norm of vertical stare decisis renders
decisional minimalism practically unimportant in the lower courts. In
other words, if the Supreme Court decides the important questions of law
and lower courts are strictly bound by those rulings, then perhaps the
scope of a lower court’s legal discretion is so narrow that there is no need
for minimalism. This objection misses the mark in two ways. First, the
Supreme Court’s capacity constraints mean that it will not be able to
decide all important questions of federal law. As Judge Friendly once
observed, the courts of appeals every year face “significant issues of
‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a
better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”). But see Michael
Coenen & Seth Davis, Percolation’s Value, 73 Stan. L. Rev. 363, 366–69 (2021) (skeptically
assessing the value of percolation).
273
See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Answering the Lochner Objection: Substantive
Due Process and the Role of Courts in a Democracy, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1902, 1954 (2021)
(arguing that courts are “important sites of communicative exchange” that “can amplify voices
marginalized in politics and make audible claims that lawmakers and the public fail to
consider”).
274
See Coenen & Davis, supra note 272, at 390–94; Caminker, supra note 13, at 56–57.
From a litigation perspective, one benefit of percolation that may be difficult to replicate is
information about the real-world effects of some particular rule of law on the ground. One
common response to a parade-of-horribles-type argument about a proposed rule is to say that
the rule has existed in X circuit for years without the sky falling. See, e.g., Perry v. New
Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 262 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (deploying this argument);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Christopher R. Riano, Marriage Equality: From Outlaws to InLaws 638–40 (2020) (suggesting that lower court rulings can create the conditions for
falsifying arguments based on stereotypes and slippery slopes). But see Coenen & Davis, supra
note 272, at 398–402 (identifying and skeptically assessing this argument). But there is no
apparent reason that a similar benefit could not come from a rule built up incrementally rather
than in one fell swoop.
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federal law, not controlled by Supreme Court decisions, which have not
previously arisen in the circuit but which the Supreme Court will not
regard as so important as to justify intervention until a conflict has arisen
or, sometimes, even when it has.”275 Since Judge Friendly wrote those
words, the Supreme Court’s docket has shrunk while the lower courts’
docket has ballooned. Indeed, one recent study concluded that the
Supreme Court is only resolving about a third of all circuit splits.276
Second, even when the Supreme Court does tackle an issue, its precedents
may be sparse or open to interpretation, leaving space for lower court
creativity.277 Third, when the Supreme Court does take up a particular
case, a lower court resolution of that case can have significant on-theground consequences until the Court’s ultimate decision.278 Finally,
district courts in particular retain discretion in finding facts, applying law
to facts, managing litigation, and calibrating remedies, much of which
happens in the interstices of legal precedent.279 In all, ensuring that lower
court judges are faithful to their proper role is “in some respects more
important than doing the same for the Supreme Court.”280
A fourth objection is that decisional minimalism may be less a
prescription than an inevitability. In other words, perhaps the very
features I have identified that counsel in favor of minimalism will also
reliably produce it. There is a small kernel of truth to this objection: I have
described the “immanent normative structure” of the judiciary as it
currently exists.281 But while the design of lower courts does give rise to
certain norms and expectations of judicial behavior, it does not guarantee
them. Take the panel precedent rule. That rigid rule may, in a healthy,
collegial culture, lead to a stable norm of not overreaching in panel
275

Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That, 46 St. John’s L. Rev. 406, 411
(1972).
276
Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Legal Uniformity in American Courts, 16 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 448, 456 (2019).
277
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 417 (2007) (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s opinions inevitably afford lower court judges some degree of discretion in
deciding cases.”); Re, supra note 22, at 924–25.
278
See, e.g., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017).
279
See Resnik, supra note 209, at 378.
280
Barrett, supra note 19, at 319 (emphasis added); H. Jefferson Powell, Judges as
Superheroes: The Danger of Confusing Constitutional Decisions with Cosmic Battles, 72 S.C.
L. Rev. 917, 921–22 (2021) (“If [circuit] judges see the law and themselves in fundamentally
distorted ways, the negative consequences—for the law and for human beings—are
incalculable.”).
281
Pozen, supra note 28, at 9.
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decisions. But there is no formal reason that a judge—perhaps a new
judge not steeped in institutional culture—could not break that norm on
an issue that she cares about. After all, as Professor Carrington once
observed, “[m]egalomania is an occupational hazard of the judicial
office.”282 A few instances of such norm violation could cause an
equilibrium to disintegrate.283 The acceleration of nationwide injunctions
over the past twenty or so years may be an example of a norm of selfrestraint in lower courts eroding.284
A final question is what lessons this defense of decisional minimalism
in the lower courts might have for so-called “structural reform” litigation.
Structural reform ligation refers to attempts to vindicate statutory and
constitutional values in the context of large, bureaucratic institutions.285
This kind of litigation is controversial because it often pushes a trial judge
into a proactive, long-term, managerial role that differs from the
traditional image of the judge as a passive umpire presiding over a bipolar,
adversarial dispute.286

282

Carrington, supra note 152, at 550.
See generally Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down,
65 UCLA L. Rev. 1430, 1435–38 (2018) (describing the “latent instability” of norms
regulating official behavior and the modes in which they break down).
284
See Jeffrey A. Rosen, Deputy Attorney General, Opening Remarks at Forum on
Nationwide Injunctions and Federal Regulatory Programs (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-jeffrey-rosen-delivers-openingremarks-forum-nationwide [https://perma.cc/Z22D-FR9B] (estimating that nationwide
injunctions in 2020 were being issued at twelve times the rate that they were in President
George W. Bush’s administration). The pace shows no signs of diminishing during the Biden
Administration. See Avalon Zoppo, 5th Circuit Judge Gregg Costa to Return to Private
Practice, Saying He’s “Better Suited to Being an Advocate,” Law.com (Feb. 9, 2022),
https://www.law.com/2022/02/09/5th-circuit-judge-gregg-costa-to-return-to-private-practice
-saying-hes-better-suited-to-being-an-advocate/ [https://perma.cc/AF5Q-QM5J] (reporting
Judges Costa’s statement in an interview that “[n]ow, it’s hard to keep track of all the
nationwide injunctions that issue and reach the court in stay motions”).
285
For classic descriptions and defenses of this form of litigation, see Abram Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1284 (1976); Owen M.
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
2–5 (1979).
286
See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016, 1017–18 (2004) (“From the outset, the
legitimacy of public law litigation was as suspect as its efficacy.”). The traditional image of
the judge is often associated with Fuller, supra note 63, though that may be an
oversimplification of Fuller’s views. See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication
and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation,
75 B.U. L. Rev. 1273, 1275 (1995).
283
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These controversies surrounding structural reform litigation are
orthogonal to the question of decisional minimalism because they concern
a different facet of the judicial function. Decisional minimalism is
addressed to judges writing opinions about the law. The most
controversial parts of structural reform litigation, by contrast, are
remedial decisions that come after liability has been determined.287
Judges wear different hats and have different roles at different phases of
litigation. Articulating legal norms (the concern of decisional
minimalism) and managing organizational remedies are different “hats.”
That said, the reasons given here for a measure of caution and humility in
writing opinions about law—especially the limits of judicial capacity, the
randomness of case assignments, and democratic legitimacy deficits—
may very well inform how remedial discretion is exercised. In particular,
they reinforce the arguments of some commentators for more limited,
experimentalist remedies that result from a process of party deliberation
rather than comprehensive, command-and-control remedies imposed
unilaterally by the judge.288
C. Prudential Minimalism
Bickel’s basic argument for prudential minimalism had two steps: the
counter-majoritarian difficulty rendered the legitimacy of judicial review
questionable to the extent that it is not rigorously principled, but it is often
imprudent or counterproductive to act in a rigorously principled fashion.
As a result, the Supreme Court needs an escape hatch from principled
adjudication. By exercising the passive virtues, the Court can avoid cases
without having to distort merits rulings that ought to be principled.
Does this argument apply to lower courts too? As noted above, the
counter-majoritarian difficulty is, if anything, heightened in lower courts
because of the appointment process and the probability of an outlier judge
or panel being assigned to a case. And the problem of precipitate and
imprudent judicial involvement seems similar: if the public is not ready
for a law to be judicially interred, then it is hard to see why it would matter
from which court the interment comes. Bickel himself was rather
dismissive of lower courts; he wrote that he had “not addressed” them
because they act as “stop-gap or relatively ministerial decision-makers
287

See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355,
1360–65 (1991).
288
See id. at 1427–44; Sabel & Simon, supra note 286, at 1019–20.
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only.”289 Whatever the truth of that assessment sixty years ago, it does not
cohere with present realities. There is nothing “stop-gap” or “ministerial”
about a nationwide injunction (or vacatur) halting a signature initiative of
a presidential administration. Since the need for prudential minimalism
seems to be present, if not entirely undiminished, in lower courts, what
tools of prudential minimalism are available?
Before answering that question, it is worth asking what contemporary
relevance Bickel’s passive virtues have even in the Supreme Court.
Gerald Gunther famously—and quite devastatingly—quipped that Bickel
was endorsing “100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time.”290 His
point, of course, was that one could not claim a commitment to principled
adjudication and then condone a subterfuge designed to avoid principled
adjudication. But, even at that time, the reality of the Supreme Court was
closer to Bickel’s vision than Gunther and Herbert Wechsler’s classical
view. A substantial part of the Court’s docket had already been converted
to certiorari jurisdiction by the 1925 Judges’ Bill.291 The Court had total
discretion over whether to hear those cases. And, though Gunther and
Wechsler did not like it,292 the Court’s residual appellate jurisdiction was
effectively treated as discretionary as well.293 That trend has only
accelerated in Bickel’s favor. In 1988, certiorari was expanded to cover
virtually all cases,294 and the Court only grants certiorari in a tiny fraction
of cases. At best, the modern Supreme Court is, by the numbers, 100%

289

Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34, at 198. Bickel’s elision of lower courts
is apparent in the very first sentence of his book: “The least dangerous branch of the American
government is the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known.” Id.
at 1. However, the Supreme Court is not the judicial branch. See Amar, supra note 245, at 239
n.115 (noting the “false equation[] of the Supreme Court and the third branch” in Bickel’s
opening).
290
Gunther, supra note 117, at 3.
291
Robert Post, The Incomparable Chief Justiceship of William Howard Taft, 20 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 1, 77–81 (2020); Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Supreme Court Under the
Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1–3 (1928).
292
See Gunther, supra note 117, at 11–12; Wechsler, supra note 112, at 9.
293
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1708–12 (2000). In 1945, a deputy clerk of the
Court said forthrightly that “[j]uisdictional statements and petitions for certiorari now stand
on practically the same footing.” Harold B. Wiley, Jurisdictional Statements on Appeals to
U.S. Supreme Court, 31 A.B.A. J. 239, 239 (1945).
294
Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662.
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principle, 1% of the time.295 The triumph of certiorari has largely obviated
the passive virtues as Bickel understood them.296 The Court now can just
about always stay its hand simply by denying certiorari; there is no need
for elaborate jurisdictional somersaults.297
But certiorari is unavailable to lower courts. So the question becomes:
Are there other techniques of prudence that are available in lower courts
that can function like Bickel’s passive virtues? After all, many of the
techniques of prudential minimalism that Bickel described—such as
standing, mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine—are
nominally available to lower courts.298 Bickel himself thought that the
answer was largely no. He wrote that lower courts “must, indeed, resolve
all controversies within their jurisdiction, because the alternative is
chaos.”299 That may be a bit overstated, but it is basically right. Lower
courts may have some discretion to control what they decide, through
devices like abstention doctrines and “prudential” standing.300 But this
discretion (to the extent it exists at all) is different in kind from certiorari.
The Supreme Court has “unlimited power” to make “ad hoc choices”
about what cases to hear.301 The lower courts, by contrast, have (at most)
295
During the 2019 Term, the total number of cases granted by the Court for plenary review
was an even 1.0%. The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—The Statistics, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 610,
618 tbl.2 (2020).
296
See Monaghan, supra note 38, at 717–18. Indeed, Wechsler recognized that “a simple
method for achieving” Bickel’s “goal” would be “the amendment of the statutes governing
appellate jurisdiction to substitute certiorari for appeal.” Wechsler, supra note 112, at 675.
That is what happened.
297
The passive virtues may still have a limited function in the Supreme Court when it wants,
for some reason, to reverse or vacate a decision below without reaching the merits (which still
requires it to grant certiorari). Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17–
18 (2004) (vacating lower court injunction on prudential standing grounds). But that is
different and narrower role than Bickel envisaged.
298
See Wechsler, supra note 112, at 675 (“[T]he techniques for the avoidance of decision
that Bickel so lucidly discusses are addressed to the propriety of any judicial intervention, not
merely to adjudication by the highest court.”).
299
Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 34, at 173.
300
See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 547–60
(1985). One could argue that lower courts have a great deal of discretion whether to issue
decisions at all; theoretically, a district court could sit on a motion or a circuit could sit on
appeal indefinitely, and that might be analogized to prudential minimalism in the Supreme
Court. The problem, again, is that this sort of freewheeling refusal to adjudicate is inconsistent
with the lower courts’ basic structural function, which is to be the first- and second-line
resolvers of legal disputes. That function is reflected in mandatory jurisdictional statutes and
the Federal Rules’s stated purpose “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
301
Shapiro, supra note 300, at 547.
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a limited, interstitial discretion that “carries with it an obligation of
reasoned and articulated decision, and that can therefore exist within a
regime of law.”302 That discretion is itself limited by precedent and
reviewable for legal error.303 It does not seem “minimalist,” in a colloquial
sense, to give lower court judges a freewheeling power to refuse to
adjudicate politically controversial cases.304 Further, the Court has
recently “cut back on the ‘abstention doctrine’” and “expressed
significant doubts about a longstanding assertion of judicial authority to
enforce ‘prudential’ standing doctrines that are rooted not in Article III
limits on judicial power, but rather in judicial notions of self-restraint.”305
In this doctrinal environment, the lower courts’ discretion to refuse to
exercise statutorily conferred jurisdiction is limited.
There is, however, one other important tool of prudential minimalism
that does not involve front-end justiciability doctrines. On the back end,
judges have fairly wide discretion to limit or tailor the remedies that they
order.306 Prudential minimalism can and should inform how that
discretion is exercised. There is a spirited debate currently unfolding in
law reviews and law reporters about the propriety of nationwide
injunctions.307 Putting aside the question whether they are permissible

302

Id. at 579.
See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127–28
(2014); Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013).
304
See Mitchell Pearsall Reich, Incomplete Designs, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 807, 824–25 (2016).
305
John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
74 n.415 (2014); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, A Cause of Action, Anyone?: Federal Equity
and the Preemption of State Law, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1807, 1811–12 (2016) (discussing
the impact of Lexmark on standing doctrine); The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Leading Case,
128 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 322 (2014) (discussing Lexmark).
306
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (“[T]he decision
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
courts . . . .”); Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017)
(“Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent
as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.”).
307
For a sampling, see generally Wasserman, supra note 31; Rachel Bayefsky, Remedies
and Respect: Rethinking the Role of Federal Judicial Relief, 109 Geo. L.J. 1263 (2021); Mila
Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 920 (2020);
Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2019);
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065 (2018); Alan
M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 67 (2019); Zayn
Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (2017); Bray, supra note 29.
303
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under Article III,308 nationwide injunctions are “now a fixture of the
modern federal judiciary’s remedial practice.”309 Prudential minimalism
is a helpful framework for seeing why and how nationwide injunctions
should be cabined. Lower court judges, when acting individually or in
random panels, should be haunted by a fear of illegitimacy, especially
when they set themselves against the judgment of the political
branches.310 And they should be sensitive to how their discretionary,
remedial choices will affect the institutional health of the judiciary as a
whole. Nationwide injunctions can fuel perceptions of judicial overreach,
interrupt the “percolation” of issues in the lower courts, and stack the deck
against the government.311 Further, from a systemic point of view, a
nationwide injunction may seize the Supreme Court’s prerogative to
exercise prudential minimalism because a nationwide injunction from a
lower court makes it difficult for the Supreme Court not to intervene in
some fashion.312 In short, to put it in Bickellian terms, the unyielding
insistence on principle in lower courts, embodied in a nationwide
injunction, can do institutional damage.313 As a matter of prudential
minimalism, a nationwide injunction should be a rare remedy of last
resort, reserved for cases of clear illegality and a strong showing of harm.
D. Thayerian Minimalism
Thayerian minimalism distinguishes between the “academic question”
whether a particular government action is unlawful and the institutional
question—“the really momentous question”—whether the Court should
disregard or invalidate that action as a result.314 In a nutshell, Thayer
thought that courts should defer to the judgment of the legislature when it
comes to how to apply a vague and open-ended document to the
308
I am skeptical of the argument that they are impermissible in all circumstances. See
James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex Parte Young, 72 Stan.
L. Rev. 1269, 1354–55 (2020).
309
Ahdout, supra note 22, at 991. For a list of recent national injunctions, see Wasserman,
supra note 31, at 188 n.4.
310
See Burt, supra note 53, at 29–33 (noting that the relevant question in assessing the
exercise of judicial authority is how a court should act despite its “questionable legitimacy”
to do so).
311
See Bray, supra note 29, at 457–65.
312
Indeed, the increase in the number of nationwide injunctions is one factor driving the
growth of the Supreme Court’s shadow docket. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Essay, The Solicitor
General and the Shadow Docket, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 123, 134 (2019).
313
See Kronman, supra note 122, at 1613–14.
314
Thayer, supra note 35, at 143–44. See Monaghan, supra note 133, at 7–14.
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“complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government.”315 For our
purposes, the critical point is that Thayer’s second question—the
institutional question—may look different in lower courts than it does in
the Supreme Court. And, to the extent one finds Thayer’s position at all
compelling in the Supreme Court, it grows even more compelling when
transposed to the lower court context.316
That is because of the institutional differences between lower courts
and the Supreme Court canvassed above: the legitimacy deficit, size,
mandatory jurisdiction, and the limits of judicial capacity. If the Supreme
Court should defer to the reasonable judgment of the legislature, then a
randomly selected district judge or panel of three, with questionable
democratic credentials, working under severe limits of time and
competence, has even more reason to defer.317 This may be simpler to
perceive when put in more colloquial terms. Imagine you are aggrieved
by some change in government policy and you are offered two
explanations: one, “the policy changed because the legislature, where
everyone is represented more or less equally, voted on the issue;” and two,
“the policy changed because a randomly selected judge, appointed a
decade ago, thought it was inconsistent with the Constitution.” I expect
that one would be considerably more chagrined by the second answer.318
Put another way, Judge Learned Hand once protested against rule by a
“bevy of Platonic Guardians”; whatever one feels about a “bevy” of nine

315

Thayer, supra note 35, at 144.
I recognize that there are few if any across-the-board Thayerians left on the bench, at
least in constitutional cases. See Monaghan, supra note 133, at 9. My point here is limited: the
case for Thayerian minimalism in the lower courts is relatively stronger than Thayerian
minimalism in the Supreme Court. And there does seem to be a resurgence of interest in
Thayerianism, at least in the academy, that may one day spill over into judicial practice. See
supra notes 139–45 and accompanying text.
317
One institutional feature of lower courts may seem to cut in the other direction: our strong
norm of vertical stare decisis. An inferior court is bound by Supreme Court precedent and
could not implement Thayerian minimalism by defying Supreme Court precedent. See Powell,
supra note 280, at 929 n.50. But Supreme Court precedents often leave ample room for
interpretive discretion in future lower court cases. Kim, supra note 277, at 417. So Thayerian
minimalism could be effectuated through “narrowing” interpretations of precedent, as well as
in cases of first impression not controlled by Supreme Court precedent. See Re, supra note 22,
at 923–27; see also Brannon P. Denning, Can Judges Be Uncivilly Obedient?, 60 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1, 49 (2018) (“[T]here is a norm among courts of appeals to read narrowly highly
salient, potentially disruptive Supreme Court decisions . . . .”).
318
See Waldron, supra note 140, at 1386–95.
316
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Justices, I would think that a random triumvirate or a single guardian
would be worse.319
How might Thayerian minimalism be invigorated in lower courts? One
simple way would be to put some teeth into the presumption of
constitutionality. As many have noted, the presumption partially
implements Thayerian minimalism.320 Lower courts could insist that the
presumption requires some deference to Congress’s resolution of
constitutional questions.321 In other words, whatever one thinks of the
Supreme Court, perhaps every single lower court should not be
empowered to exercise independent judgment about the Constitution’s
meaning in the face of a prior legislative interpretation.322
Another possibility would be to retain or strengthen Chevron deference
in lower courts,323 even if it is vitiated by the Supreme Court.324 Chevron
deference can and has been understood as a form of Thayerian
319

Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 73 (1958).
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality
and the Individual Mandate, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1715, 1729–31 (2013); Ruth Colker & James
J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80, 88–89 (2001). The presumption in some
respects does not go as far as Thayer’s prescription. It does not, for example, generally apply
to cases involving “fundamental individual rights.” Metzger & Morrison, supra, at 1730; see
also F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1447, 1460 (2010) (contrasting Thayerian deference with the presumption of
constitutionality).
321
For one example, see Judge Silberman’s opinion upholding the Affordable Care Act.
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We are obliged—and this might well
be our most important consideration—to presume that acts of Congress are constitutional.”),
abrogated by NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
322
Cf. Monaghan, supra note 133, at 7–14 (distinguishing between independent judgment
and deference, with Thayer advocating the latter). This brief discussion papers over some
complexities, including whether the presumption should apply to all questions of law or fact,
whether it should apply the same way in district courts and courts of appeals, and whether it
should apply to state, as well as federal, legislation. A full exploration of the presumption of
constitutionality in lower courts would be a separate, and quite worthwhile, project.
323
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Essay, The Future of Deference, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1293,
1313–14 (2016) (suggesting this possibility); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable
Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 727, 736–54 (2013) (making the
case for greater deference in lower courts than the Supreme Court); cf. Coenen & Davis, supra
note 21, at 799–820 (arguing that one exception to Chevron should be confined to the Supreme
Court). Chevron deference may also facilitate decisional minimalism in lower courts (in
addition to Thayerian minimalism) because a court applying Chevron deference will leave an
agency with a range of reasonable readings of a statute to choose from rather than imposing
the one reading that best accords with a court’s independent judgment.
324
As many have noted, the Supreme Court in recent years “has significantly backed away
from Chevron deference.” Monaghan, supra note 2, at 59.
320
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minimalism: in cases where the meaning of a statute is contestable, the
theory goes, courts should defer to the more democratically accountable
official.325 In light of the institutional features already discussed, the case
for lower courts to defer to the expert and politically accountable
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes seems quite
strong, at least relative to the Supreme Court. Indeed, as the Court
considers the future of Chevron, the far-reaching importance of the sorts
of statutory questions that come before it could warp the Court’s sense of
the quotidian reality of administrative law in the D.C. Circuit and other
lower courts. To this, one could add a powerful pragmatic point stressed
by Professor Peter Strauss: the Chevron doctrine has the effect of
preventing circuit splits and ensuring that administration is not fractured
by lower court judges disagreeing about the de novo meaning of federal
statutes.326
E. Putting the Supreme Court in Context
To this point, we have studied how the institutional features of the
lower courts bear on the proper role of a lower court judge. But
appreciating the full institutional context of the judiciary also helps to
bring the Supreme Court’s proper role into focus. The Supreme Court
supervises the lower judiciary by answering abstracted questions of law
in the vanishingly small number of cases that it chooses to hear. In those
circumstances, decisional minimalism does not make sense as a general
norm of adjudication, though there are pockets of cases where it may be
a useful tool.327
325
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984);
Mashaw, supra note 237, at 170. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law,
133 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 867–68 (2020); Matthew Lewans, Administrative Law and Judicial
Deference 12 (2016). One could question this account of Chevron on the ground that judicial
review merely enforces Congress’s choices, which is the most democratically legitimate
branch. To the extent one is inclined to see judicial review in those terms, the suggestions in
this section could be confined to cases of genuine ambiguity, where there is no congressional
choice discernible.
326
See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 1093, 1121–22 (1987).
327
For similar arguments about the Supreme Court’s role, see Schauer, supra note 38, at
206–08; Grove, supra note 38, at 3–4; Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 230, at 224–25;
Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27 Rutgers L.J.
543, 559–61 (1996). Professor Tara Leigh Grove has also suggested that “minimalism” from
the Supreme Court may thrust lower courts into political controversies and thus harm their
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The critical moment in the creation of the modern Supreme Court was
the Judiciary Act of February 13, 1925, known as the “Judges’ Bill”
because it was drafted by the Court under the stewardship of Chief Justice
Taft.328 The Judges’ Bill “acceded to the Court’s desire for drastic
limitations upon its [mandatory] jurisdiction” by expanding the classes of
cases that the Court reviews through the discretionary writ of certiorari.329
It embodied Taft’s “radical new theory” of the Supreme Court’s function:
it exists to expound the law for the benefit of the public, not to resolve
disputes between litigants.330 The essence was that a litigant is entitled to
a hearing and disposition in a trial court and an appeal as of right in an
intermediate court of appeals but has no right to Supreme Court review.331
Supreme Court review “is not primarily to preserve the rights of the
litigants.”332 Rather, its purpose is “expounding and stabilizing principles
of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing upon
constitutional questions and other important questions of law for the
public benefit.”333 As Taft recognized, the Judges’ Bill freed the Court to
perform that function by enlarging its freedom to choose its cases.334
Indeed, even the pockets of mandatory jurisdiction that nominally
remained, like certain appeals from state courts and questions certified by
circuit courts, were largely converted by the Court to discretionary review

sociological legitimacy. Tara Leigh Grove, Essay, Sacrificing Legitimacy in a Hierarchical
Judiciary, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1555, 1611 (2021). On doctrinal techniques that help the
Supreme Court constrain lower courts effectively, see Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation
and Distrust, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2045, 2048–49 (2008).
328
Pub. L. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925). See Hartnett, supra note 293, at 1644; Post, supra
note 291, at 77.
329
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 291, at 1–2. Congress had first authorized discretionary
review through certiorari of certain cases out of the newly created circuit courts in the 1891
Evarts Act. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828; Hartnett,
supra note 293, at 1650–51.
330
Post, supra note 291, at 70, 82.
331
Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court, supra note
150.
332
Id.
333
Id.
334
William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Act of February
13, 1925, 35 Yale L.J. 1, 2 (1925).
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as a practical matter.335 Beyond that, the Court claimed the power to limit
grants of certiorari to particular questions.336
A century after the Judges’ Bill, these trends have continued. In 1988,
Congress eliminated most of the Court’s remaining mandatory
jurisdiction.337 And the Court has developed an array of “agenda control”
devices that allow it to control with precision what questions it decides
and when.338 The Court can even rewrite the questions as presented by the
parties or decide the case on a ground that is not briefed.339
The upshot is that the Court is increasingly detached from the particular
dispute before it. It primarily resolves questions rather than cases. In the
lingo of the “cert pool,” cases are “vehicles” through which the Court
expounds the law for the public.340 The more contaminated by facts, the
less attractive a case is for the Court’s consideration. When the Court
grants certiorari, it hopes and expects that its decisions will have a wide
impact. As Chief Justice Vinson put it: “To remain effective, the Supreme
Court must continue to decide only those cases which present questions
whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the
particular facts and parties involved.”341 Summing up these discretionary
powers of agenda control, Professor Henry Monaghan has written that
“[t]he Court’s current place in our constitutional order distinguishes it in
kind, not in degree, from other courts.”342
335
Hartnett, supra note 293, at 1708–12. This development was not without its academic
dissenters. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:
Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043,
1061 (1977) (arguing that it is “inadmissible” that the Court should treat its mandatory
jurisdiction as equivalent to its certiorari jurisdiction).
336
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928); Hartnett, supra note 293, at
1705–07.
337
Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662.
338
These are exhaustively catalogued in Monaghan, supra note 38, at 683–711.
339
Hartnett, supra note 293, at 1712. For a skeptical take on this practice, see generally
Benjamin B. Johnson, The Origins of Supreme Court Question Selection, 121 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
340
See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 124,
136–37 (2014) (calling the “notion of a ‘vehicle’ ” a “kind of supplementary ‘standing’ ” ).
341
Fred M. Vinson, Address to the American Bar Association: Work of the Federal Courts
(Sept. 7, 1949), reprinted in 69 S. Ct., at v, vi (1949).
342
Monaghan, supra note 38, at 684; see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse
Advisory Opinions, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859, 863 (2013) (“Over the past decade, the law
declaration model has made substantial inroads and arguably now dominates Supreme Court
decision making.”). There is, as a result, a “profound tension between certiorari and classic
conceptions of judicial power.” Hartnett, supra note 293, at 1718. See Herbert Wechsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1006 (1965) (espousing the classical
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That distinction “in kind” matters when it comes decisional
minimalism. If the function of the modern Supreme Court is “to decide
only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have
immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties
involved,” then it would be bizarre to resolve those cases narrowly and
shallowly—that is, in a manner that would minimize those cases’
“importance . . . beyond the particular facts and parties involved.”343 A
narrow disposition seems especially problematic given the scarcity of the
Court’s time and attention, which at this point limits it to only sixty or so
merits cases per year. To invoke the well-known distinction again,
decisional minimalism makes less sense for a law-declaration court with
a small, discretionary docket than it does for a dispute-resolution court
with a large, mandatory docket.344 Indeed, there is almost nothing the
Supreme Court does that is not by choice. Any time it grants certiorari
and decides a case, there is a “narrower” option available—the denial of
certiorari in the first place. To get involved at all, then, is already in part
to traduce decisional minimalism.345
At the same time, the design of the Court is ironically more likely to
produce minimalist outcomes than are the designs of appellate or district
courts. That is because the Court is composed of nine Justices that always
sit together when deciding merits cases. No decision can command a
majority unless it gains the assent of five separate Justices. As Sunstein

view). The Court can no longer take refuge in the fact that it is forced by its jurisdictional
statutes to decide a case. The triumph of certiorari thus had significant implications for the
Court’s legitimacy. As Professor Robert Post has observed, after the Judges’ Bill “the Court
would throughout the twentieth century be required to search for ways to justify its decisions
despite the fact that it was selecting its own cases to serve ends extrinsic to the cases
themselves.” Post, supra note 291, at 85. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia’s carefully
worded Wechslerian defense of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000): “My court didn’t bring the
case into the courts.” Nat’l Const. Ctr., Const. Daily, On This Day, Bush v. Gore Settles 2000
Presidential Race (Dec. 12, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-day-bush-vgore-anniversary [https://perma.cc/65JG-RVFR]. True, but it did choose to bring the case into
the Court.
343
Vinson, supra note 341, at vi; see Strauss, supra note 326, at 1103 (“If the [Supreme
Court’s] undertaking from the start were to address legal uncertainties of a general character,
simply resolving the dispute in such a case would be an admission of defeat.”); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreword: Clarifying the “Clear Meaning” of Separability, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79,
82 (2017) (critiquing a copyright decision for hewing narrowly to the facts and failing to
provide guidance to lower courts).
344
See Fallon et al., supra note 147, at 73–75 (distinguishing the law-declaration and
dispute-resolution models).
345
Siegel, supra note 43, at 1958 (calling this “the paradox of certiorari”).
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has noted, “[t]he constraints of group decisionmaking [on the Court] may
make minimalism inevitable, at least if the Court seeks a majority opinion
with at least five signatories.”346
In all, decisional minimalism is in deep tension with the institutional
logic of the Supreme Court.347 And yet, some degree of decisional
minimalism is inevitable in light of its multimember design. In these
circumstances, decisional minimalism does not seem to make sense as a
general prescription for Supreme Court decision making. This is not to
say the Supreme Court must or should aspire to “maximalism” in every
case. Sometimes the Court “behaves imprudently when it formulates
broadly sweeping rules or tests without sufficient knowledge of the range
of factual situations to which they will apply.”348 In particular, decisional
minimalism may make sense when the Court is effectively compelled to
grant certiorari and thus has its docket discretion undermined. That is the
case, for instance, when a lower court invalidates a law of Congress and
enters a broad remedy, because the Supreme Court feels a powerful
institutional responsibility to intervene. But again, decisional minimalism
does not seem advisable as a general prescription.
III. REALIZING LOWER COURT MINIMALISM
I have tried to show so far that the case for judicial minimalism is
stronger in the lower courts than it is in the Supreme Court. In this Part, I
turn to some suggestions for realizing lower court minimalism.349 I begin
346

Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1082 (2009).
This institutional logic is not constitutionally mandated or inherent in the idea of an apex
court. Cf. Grove, supra note 38, at 40 (“[T]he Constitution creates a hierarchical judiciary and
renders the Court ‘supreme’ in defining the content of federal law.”). My point is just that
decisional minimalism is in tension with the premises of the institution as it actually has
developed and now functions in our legal system. For a discussion of decisional minimalism
in the very different environment of the European Court of Justice, arguing that judicial
minimalism is largely “inevitable” there in light of the European Union’s “institutional
architecture,” see Daniel Sarmiento, Half a Case at a Time: Dealing with Judicial Minimalism
at the European Court of Justice, in Constitutional Conversations in Europe: Actors, Topics
and Procedures 13, 14 (Monica Claes et al. eds., 2012).
348
Fallon, supra note 207, at 950–51.
349
In this Article, I have not tried to quantify in a rigorous way the extent of non-minimalism
in the lower courts now or whether non-minimalism has increased in recent years. That would
be a complex project because “coding” minimalism in a comprehensive empirical study would
require a qualitative and time-intensive judgment that would have to be applied consistently
to a huge dataset of opinions. While such a project would be valuable if it were executed well,
the argument of this Article does not depend on having a particular quantum of nonminimalism in the lower courts. My ambition, rather, is to offer a theoretical and normative
347
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with the need for situation-specific concepts of judicial role fidelity and
then offer a few rough-hewn proposals for structural reform.
A. Unflattening Judicial Role Fidelity
“Role fidelity” refers to the way that a judge’s self-conception of her
institutional role informs the way that she judges. Professor Cover, for
instance, explored how anti-slavery judges enforced fugitive slave laws
because they conceived their role to exclude reliance on personal
morality.350 Judicial role fidelity is an application of the broader concept
in social psychology of “role theory,” which studies how social positions
and expectations shape behavior.351
Judicial role fidelity has two notable features. First, it is not (or should
not be) monolithic; that is, it is not uniform across all different judges
embedded in different institutional positions.352 The “role fidelity” of a
lower court judge can and should be different from the “role fidelity” of
a Supreme Court Justice. Second, “role fidelity” is not static. Our
conception of the judicial role can respond to sociopolitical change.
Professor Jed Shugerman, for instance, has posited that the rise of judicial
elections in the nineteenth century may have “create[d] a new selfmodel for lower court judging. That said, I believe there is a growing, inchoate sense in both
the legal academy and the legal community more broadly that lower courts are overreaching
in various ways, and I hope this Article will help to give that inchoate sense more analytical
traction. The proliferation of nationwide injunctions is one trend contributing to that sense
right now. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. And as an anecdotal matter, as I write
these words in early 2022, there has over the past few months been a spate of notably nonminimalist opinions in lower courts—along all three dimensions of minimalism discussed
above—on subjects ranging from vaccine mandates, BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th
604 (5th Cir. 2021), stay dissolved by In re MCP No. 165, 21 F.4th 357 (6th Cir. 2021), stay
granted sub nom. NFIB v. OSHA, Nos. 21A244 & 21A247, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 13, 2022) (per
curiam); immigration policy, Texas v. Biden, 20 F.4th 928, 1004 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. granted,
No. 21-954, 2022 WL 497412 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2022); gun rights, McDougall v. Cnty. of
Ventura, 23 F.4th 1095 (9th Cir. 2022); and climate change, Louisiana v. Biden, No. 2:21CV-01074, 2022 WL 438313 (W.D. La. Feb. 11, 2022), stay pending appeal granted, No. 2230087, 2022 WL 866282 (5th Cir. Mar. 16, 2022). I do not mean to suggest that the trend is
confined entirely to “conservative” judges. See, for example, notes 360–74 and accompanying
text.
350
See Cover, supra note 2, at 192–93.
351
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity,
and American Tort Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 1349, 1396–1401 (2010); see B.J. Biddle, Recent
Development in Role Theory, 12 Ann. Rev. Socio. 67, 68 (1986). As Shugerman points out,
the concept of judicial role fidelity resembles Llewellyn’s concept of judicial “situationsense.” Shugerman, supra, at 1398 (citing Llewellyn, supra note 202, at 60–61, 122–23).
352
Pozen, supra note 23, at 2084.
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conception” of the judicial role, giving rise to “a more democratic
approach” to judging “that legitimized both constituency and
conscience.”353 Whether or not one agrees with Shugerman’s specific
historical point, the more basic premise seems unexceptionable—that the
parameters of judicial “role fidelity” can and do change over time.
Role models of judging—in law school and legal culture more
generally—tend to be drawn from the ranks of Justices, and the resulting
judicial role fidelity is skewed heavily toward apex courts.354 This has
unduly flattened judicial role fidelity, even though a Justice is the rarest
type of judge in numerical terms. The concept of role fidelity should be
tailored to institutional situation, and, in my view, should inculcate in
lower court judges an instinct to favor decisional minimalism.355 That new
sense of role fidelity can be created in three fora: first, through academic
and popular commentary (like this Article); second, through appellate
review; and third, through the appointment process in the political
branches.
1. Commentary
Judges are not walled off from academic and popular commentary.
Despite the familiar lament that the academy and bench have drifted

353

Shugerman, supra note 351, at 1399.
Consider, for example, the case of Judge Friendly. Professor Vermeule has observed that
his “characteristic mode of analysis . . . was to show that some sweeping proposition of law
was oversimplified, and that the issues and cases covered by the proposition were in fact
complex and heterogeneous, requiring fact-sensitive judgment according to standards rather
than rules.” Adrian Vermeule, Local Wisdom, New Republic (Mar. 22, 2012),
https://newrepublic.com/article/98607/henry-friendly-supreme-court-david-dorsen [https://pe
rma.cc/NKP3-MKMJ]. Accordingly, “Friendly’s contribution was not to enrich the theory of
the law but to provide a living model of lawyerly craft and good judgment.” Id. In other words,
he was a minimalist. But, as Vermeule points out, “the reputations of judges such as Friendly
generally have a shorter half-life than the reputations of judges who offer fertile theoretical
ideas that can be distilled into formulas, theorems, and pithy aphorisms.” Id. Our legal culture
tends to lionize the theorists but not the craftspeople, which may make some sense in the
context of apex courts. But that tendency may inappropriately tempt lower court judges toward
a more “law-declaration” mode.
355
To be more precise, “a particular social status involves, not a single associated role, but
an array of associated roles” called a “role-set.” Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social
Structure 369 (rev. ed. 1957). In other words, the status of a federal judge may entail not only
a particular role in the resolution of cases, but also distinctive roles in interactions with clerks
or in public appearances. See id. My focus here is on the role of federal judges in deciding
public law cases.
354
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apart,356 the reality is complex. Judges continue to cite scholarship in their
opinions, and, perhaps more importantly, their chambers are staffed by
clerks fresh out of law school who have been recently socialized there
into a particular sense of the judicial role. For these reasons, “the
sociological connections between the legal academy, the courts, and the
administrative state are close enough to enable a prescriptive theory of
public law, under the right conditions, to move quickly from the law
reviews and lecture halls to the United States Reports”—and, I would add,
the Federal Reporter and the Federal Supplement.357
The goal of this Article is to offer a trans-substantive, conceptual
vocabulary for thinking about the proper role of lower court judges. This
vocabulary allows us to evaluate and critique judicial behavior in a useful
way—in a way that does not reduce to local disagreement with particular
decisions and is not overtly partisan. Indeed, the institutional
circumstances of lower courts are such that it may be possible for our
legal culture to coalesce around an understanding of the proper role of a
lower court judge in a way that is probably out of reach for the proper role
of a Supreme Court Justice. In other words, the role of a Justice—whether
a Justice should be a minimalist, a maximalist, an originalist, a moral
philosopher in a Dworkinian sense, or what have you—is likely to remain
essentially contested.358 But the role definition implied by the design of
the lower judiciary for a judge seems to be clearer, less controversial, and
therefore more normatively compelling than public law theories in the
Supreme Court. And if legal elites can come together on a role definition
for lower court judges, then that consensus can alter the sociological
environment in which judges operate and therefore influence their
behavior.359

356
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 34 (1992).
357
Kessler & Pozen, supra note 144, at 1880; see also Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a
Human Scale, 108 Yale L.J. 2279, 2348–49 (1999) (describing the process of academic
influence on judicial practice).
358
See Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of
Law or Politics?, 119 Yale L.J. Online 99, 102 (2010) (“I am confident that there is today no
widely shared view—let alone anything that could be called a ‘consensus’—as to what the
Court’s role has been or should be in our twenty-first century world.”).
359
See Schauer, supra note 42, at 631.
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2. Appellate Review
A little-noticed case decided by the Supreme Court in 2020 shows how
appellate review may encourage and even enforce minimalism. In United
States v. Sineneng-Smith,360 the defendant was convicted of violating a
statute making it a federal crime to “encourag[e] or induc[e]” a noncitizen
to enter the United States with knowledge that the entry would be
unlawful.361 In district court, she argued that the statute did not cover her
conduct, was void for vagueness, and was an impermissible content-based
restraint on speech.362 She lost. On appeal, she repeated the same
arguments in her briefs and oral argument.363 After argument, however,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel “moved” the case
“onto a different track.”364 It invited three non-party organizations to file
briefs as amici curiae addressing three questions framed by the panel,
including a constitutional question that the defendant “herself never
raised”: whether the statute was “facially overbroad” and therefore invalid
under the First Amendment.365 The panel limited the parties to
supplemental briefs responding to the amici and allocated twice as much
oral argument time to the amici as to the defendant.366
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held
that “the appeals panel departed so drastically from the principle of party
presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”367 The Court
explained that, “as a general rule, our system is designed around the
premise that parties represented by competent counsel know what is best
for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument
entitling them to relief.”368 Simply put, “courts are essentially passive
instruments of government.”369 They forsake that passivity if they seize
control of a case from the parties. The Court acknowledged
“circumstances in which a modest initiating role for a court is
360

140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020).
Id. at 1577 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)).
362
Id. at 1580.
363
Id.
364
Id. at 1578.
365
Id. at 1578, 1581.
366
Id. at 1581.
367
Id. at 1578.
368
Id. at 1579 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Castro v. United
States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement)).
369
Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Samuels,
808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc)).
361
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appropriate.”370 But “the Ninth Circuit’s radical transformation” of that
case went “well beyond the pale.”371
Sineneng-Smith enforced a norm of decisional minimalism. A federal
appeals court should, by and large, adjudicate the questions presented to
it by the parties, not questions of its own devising. That will tend to
prevent the court from deciding unnecessary questions. In SinenengSmith, for instance, the appeals panel not only injected a new
constitutional issue into the case but arguably injected an issue that was
broader than that already raised in the case because it was a facial rather
than an as-applied challenge.372 As the Court recognized, a departure from
the party-presentation principle may be warranted when the case can “be
resolved on a basis narrower than the question presented.”373 But that is a
departure in the service of minimalism. In short, Sineneng-Smith should
modestly encourage minimalism in lower courts and convey a sense of
proper role fidelity for a lower court judge.374
3. The Appointment Process
The appointment process constructs judicial role fidelity in two ways.
Most directly, it determines who becomes a federal judge. Anyone who
aspires to a judgeship, then, will embody or emulate the traits that are
rewarded in the judicial confirmation process. Second, even for those who
370

Id.
Id. at 1581–82. On the uncertain outer bounds of the Sineneng-Smith doctrine, see
Zachary B. Pohlman, The Sineneng-Smith Doctrine, 13 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3862443 [https://per
ma.cc/J5SG-YZMU].
372
Cf. Fallon, supra note 207, at 923–24 n.31 (suggesting that, in lower courts, the
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges should be reconceived in terms of breadth
and narrowness).
373
Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1582; see Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke
L.J. 447, 481 (2009) (“[J]udges might also raise new issues to narrow the scope of their
decisions, thwarting litigants who would prefer a maximalist judicial decision over a
minimalist one.”).
374
My quarrel with the Court’s opinion is its uncritical assumption that the Supreme Court
should abide by the same rules. See Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1579 n.4. The Justices have
often transformed cases in radical ways. For a couple of famous examples, see Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court also often
appoints amici to argue positions not taken by the parties. Monaghan, supra note 38, at 691–
93. Indeed, in Sineneng-Smith itself, the party presentation issue was hardly briefed; the
parties’ focus was on the merits of the First Amendment question. The Court’s hypocrisy,
though, is only apparent because of the different structural function that the Court has now
assumed as compared to the courts of appeals. The Court’s greater flexibility is well-suited to
a predominantly “law-declaration” national court.
371
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are already federal judges, the confirmation process may be influential.
Lower court judges all enjoy at least a prospect of promotion—from
district court to appellate court and from appellate court to Supreme
Court. A view of judging articulated in the confirmation process can thus
furnish a template for self-advancement.375 Finally, the confirmation
hearing itself functions as a kind of ritualized focal point for exploring
and contesting the nature of the judicial role.376 The questions and
commentary of Senators and the answers of nominees are opportunities
for collective reflection on how judges should judge.377
I cannot undertake here an exhaustive study of the appointment process
in the lower courts or a comprehensive analysis of recent appointments.378
But two developments are concerning to the extent that one would look
to the process to reinforce a norm of minimalism. First, the lower court
appointment process has grown more politically contentious and
dysfunctional.379 Second, the ideological purification of the parties and
the elimination of the filibuster have made possible (and perhaps abetted)
375

Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges:
A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 363 (2013) (“Our results suggest that
court of appeals judges who have a good shot at the Supreme Court tend to alter their judicial
behavior in order to increase their chances . . . .”). To put this in the language of role theory,
Senators have power (shared with the President) to control a judge’s further advancement in
the organization of the federal judiciary. See Shugerman, supra note 351, at 1398
(“Organization role theorists have contended that those in organizational roles resolve their
frequent role conflicts by judging who holds power in the organization and which norms are
most legitimate.”).
376
See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial
Confirmation Hearings, 115 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 38, 44–45 n.24 (2006) (noting that the
confirmation process reflects “the Constitution’s dual commitment to self-government and the
rule of law in matters concerning the structure of the judiciary”); Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note
on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 Yale L.J. 657, 658 (1970) (“The
things which I contend are both proper and indispensable for a Senator’s consideration . . . are
things that have definitely to do with the performance of the judicial function.”).
377
Consider, for instance, the success of Chief Justice Roberts’s “umpire” metaphor in a
defining a certain conception of the judicial role. See Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On
Integration and Legitimation, 24 Const. Comment. 701, 702–03 (2007); see also Stephen B.
Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of Law: A Field Guide to the Current
Political War over the Judiciary, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 427, 436 (2008) (describing how the
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito hearings “offered an opportunity for Democrat and
Republican Senators to articulate two very different ideas of what a Supreme Court Justice
ought to do”). Of course, these representations of the judicial role blend myth and reality, but
even myths may exert normative pull.
378
For a recent overview, see Devins & Larsen, supra note 42, at 1390–405.
379
See Binder & Maltzmann, supra note 247, at 2–6; Barry Friedman & Margaret H. Lemos,
Dysfunction, Deference, and Judicial Review, 30 Geo. Mason L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 16–19) (on file with author).
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more ideological judicial appointments.380 The result (to put it mildly) is
that candidates tend not to be rewarded for judicial craft and role fidelity.
The recent elevation of Judge Justin R. Walker to the D.C. Circuit
provides an opportunity to reflect on how the appointment process can
inscribe a particular version of the judicial role. President Trump
nominated Judge Walker to the D.C. Circuit on April 3, 2020, less than
six months after taking his seat as a district judge in Kentucky.381 Eight
days later, in a case called On Fire Christian Center, Inc. v. Fischer, he
enjoined the mayor of Louisville from enforcing “any prohibition on
drive-in church services at” the plaintiff’s church, which had (putatively)
been put in place as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.382 The On Fire
decision was non-minimalist in all three senses of the term, and it seems
only to have aided his confirmation.
First, it was wide and deep. The first sentence of the discussion will
give a flavor: “According to St. Paul, the first pilgrim was Abel.”383 The
opinion “provided a thorough exegesis of religious freedom from biblical
times,” citing the Bible, Tacitus, and De Tocqueville.384 In other words,
it gave a deep—historically and theoretically ambitious—account of the
nature of religious liberty in America.385 It was also broad: after eight
Federal Supplement pages devoted primarily to the federal constitutional
380

See Jonathan Remy Nash & Joanna Shepherd, Filibuster Change and Judicial
Appointments, 17 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 646, 649 (2020); Devins & Larsen, supra note 42,
at 1399. The withering of the so-called “blue-slip” process in the Senate—that is, the norm of
deference to home state Senators on lower court nominees—may also have a part in this story,
as it could plausibly have led to more ideological and nationally prominent nominees rather
than qualified lawyers respected by the local legal community. See Joseph Fishkin & David
E. Pozen, Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies and a Research Agenda, 119
Colum. L. Rev. Online 158, 170–71 (2019) (discussing the demise of the blue-slip).
381
Carl Hulse, President Picks McConnell Protégé for Seat on Appeals Bench, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 2020, at A21.
382
453 F. Supp. 3d 901, 904 (W.D. Ky. 2020).
383
Id. at 905.
384
Josh Blackman, Courts Should Not Decide Issues That Are Not There, Reason: The
Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 12, 2020, 2:35 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/04/12/courtsshould-not-decide-issues-that-are-not-there/ [https://perma.cc/D28G-4Q4H].
385
At his confirmation hearing, Judge Walker suggested that “I did not believe that it would
be possible to explain the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause without explaining the history
of the Free Exercise Clause.” U.S. Court of Appeals DC Circuit Confirmation Hearing,
CSPAN May 6, 2020, at 17:29–40, https://www.c-span.org/video/?471829-1/us-courtappeals-dc-circuit-confirmation-hearing# [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing]. That is not
persuasive. One important function of doctrine implementing constitutional protections is to
avoid these sorts of deep forays into history and theory in future cases, especially when a court
is operating under extraordinary time pressure. Fallon, supra note 82, at 116.
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claims, the court ruled that the mayor’s order was unlawful on statutory
grounds (specifically, because it violated Kentucky’s Religious Freedom
Restoration Act).386 A decision on the difficult federal constitutional
question was not necessary to sustain the temporary restraining order
(“TRO”).387
Second, the order was apparently unnecessary. After the order issued,
the mayor said that he had only “strongly suggest[ed]” that people not
attend services for their own health and that there was “no legal
enforcement mechanism.”388 The TRO was issued ex parte, without
hearing from the mayor, because (the opinion explained) providing notice
would have been “impractical.”389 But, as Professor Josh Blackman wrote
soon after, the TRO might have been obviated by a fifteen-minute status
conference.390 “[T]he District Court could have simply denied the TRO
as moot on the Mayor’s official representation that there would be no
enforcement action.”391 Instead, the court spent twenty-four hours
“writing a twenty-page published decision, with 86 footnotes.”392 If
true,393 that is the antithesis of prudential minimalism.394 Finally, as for
Thayerian minimalism, the order overturned (or purported to overturn)

386

On Fire, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 913. Technically, the court found that the plaintiff had a
“strong likelihood of success” due to the preliminary procedural posture. Id. at 910, 913.
387
Blackman, supra note 384.
388
Matthew Glowicki, Judge Allows Drive-in Service at Louisville Church, Says Fischer
“Criminalized” Easter, Louisville Courier J. (Apr. 11, 2020, 2:49 PM) https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/2020/04/11/covid-19-kentucky-judge-grants-churchs-request-holdservices/2976560001/ [https://perma.cc/Z6Q5-T2LE].
389
On Fire, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 904.
390
Blackman, supra note 384.
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
At his subsequent hearing, Judge Walker said that the Mayor had never tried to contact
chambers and that the plaintiffs had reached out to the Mayor on the day before filing the suit
to clarify whether they could hold their service but received no response. Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 385, at 16:06–23, 1:57:00–24. But it seems probable that a compulsory
status conference from the court would have elicited a response and may have obviated the
dispute.
394
In addition, while Judge Walker nominally limited his injunction to the parties before the
Court, he added in a footnote: “Louisville ought not to view the limits of this injunction as a
green light to violate the religious liberty of non-parties.” On Fire, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 904 n.2
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). That seemed to be a threat to the Mayor not to enforce the order
against other parties, even though Judge Walker’s order had no formal preclusive or
precedential effect beyond the parties.
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the judgment of “politically accountable officials” in the midst of a public
health crisis.395
In sum, the On Fire decision was non-minimalist in all three respects.
And it was issued at a time of deep social and political conflict over both
the pandemic and religious freedom—precisely when, according to
minimalists, judges should proceed with the most humility and
circumspection.396 How did it play in the confirmation process? Senator
McConnell, who had sponsored Judge Walker’s nomination to the D.C.
Circuit, swiftly issued a laudatory tweet.397 At Judge Walker’s hearing,
the opinion garnered more praise than unease. Senator Rand Paul kicked
off the hearing by praising Judge Walker’s “fidelity to our
Constitution . . . even in times of crisis”—without asking about fidelity to
role.398 Senator Graham asked Judge Walker to explain his ruling but
asked no follow up questions.399 Senator Lee suggested it would be a
“dereliction of . . . duty” not to intervene.400 In all, there was virtually no
meaningful interrogation of whether the On Fire decision accorded with
a district judge’s role fidelity in a hierarchical judiciary.401
There are, of course, limits to the substantive engagement one can
expect at a confirmation hearing. I am not sanguine about the intellectual
promise of such a setting. But Judge Walker’s hearing illustrates how far
we are from a political and legal culture that appreciates the distinct—and
distinctly minimalist—role fidelity of a lower court judge.

395

S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief) (“Our Constitution principally
entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the
States ‘to guard and protect.’ ” (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905))).
396
See, e.g., Ian Lovett, Some Churches Fight to Open on Easter Despite Coronavirus
Shutdowns, Wall St. J. (Apr. 12, 2020, 1:17 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/somechurches-fight-to-open-on-easter-despite-coronavirus-shutdowns-11586622443 [https://perm
a.cc/5TRE-7LTA] (noting that “religious spaces have become a battleground”).
397
Mitchell McConnell (@LeaderMcConnell), Twitter (Apr. 11, 2020, 3:35 PM),
https://twitter.com/LeaderMcConnell/status/1249058586761846786 [https://perma.cc/93SK8W2E] (praising the “strong, eloquent ruling”).
398
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 385, at 5:11–17.
399
Id. at 17:42–18:07.
400
Id. at 55:25.
401
Democrats focused, by and large, on criticizing the fact that a confirmation hearing was
being held at all during a pandemic. There were a few exceptions: Senator Leahy suggested
that the opinion contained “overblown rhetoric” and that the judge had been “applying for a
job” on the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 37:06–16. Senator Hirono criticized Judge Walker for not
hearing from the city. Id. at 1:56:10–52.
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B. Structural Reforms
There are probably limits to what one can achieve by importuning
lower court judges (and aspirants to judicial office) to be more
minimalist.402 At the end of the day, the federal judiciary is large, and it
is unrealistic to hope that the thousand or so federal judges will all fall in
line for judicial minimalism without some external prodding.403 And even
a few judges breaking ranks can be harmful, both because of the dangers
of maximalist rulings already canvassed and because it could provoke
others to even the score. So, a certain amount of attention to structure is
important to the minimalist project.404 At the same time, I do not want
reform proposals to appear unrealistic. I therefore take as given the basic
structure of the federal judiciary, which has been in place since the 1891
Evarts Act and 1925 Judges’ Bill, as well as our strong norms of vertical
stare decisis and judicial supremacy. I put to the side possibilities such as
a new national court of appeals or changing the size of appellate panels. I
focus instead on low-hanging fruit that would be both achievable and
meaningful in the near term.
1. Nationwide Injunctions
It is a general pattern of the judicial system that the more legally
consequential a decision is, the more judges must concur in it.405 A district
judge acts alone, a court of appeals sits in panels of three judges, and the
Supreme Court sits together as nine Justices. This pattern reflects an
instinct that collectivity improves judicial decision making.406 As
discussed, collectivity also conduces to minimalism because it means
402
Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1743, 1744–45 (2013) (highlighting the problem of normative proposals in public law
scholarship that depend upon the very officials critiqued in a diagnostic section).
403
See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 996 (2002) (“A judiciary staffed
by hundreds of judges, each with life tenure and an irreducible salary, cannot trust its
individual members always to act discreetly—cannot, that is, count on them all to avoid
trouble by exercising Alexander Bickel’s famous ‘passive virtues.’” ).
404
Cf. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 142, at 826–27 (distinguishing “internal,” “external,”
and “structural” approaches to Thayerian reform, and advocating the latter two); Lewis
Kornhauser, Deciding Together, 1 J. Institutional Stud. 38, 40–41 (2015) (“The designer must
structure the institution in a way that maximizes its performance relative to the institutional
aims.”).
405
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 214, at 82.
406
See id.; Hart, supra note 154, at 100; Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court
Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev. 1, 23–25 (1979).
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certain decisions must reflect an overlapping consensus of more than one
judge. Set against this pattern, nationwide injunctions are a striking
anomaly. Few decisions are more legally consequential than halting a
federal policy nationwide. In practical effect, it is like a decision from the
Supreme Court, which can determine applicable rights and remedies
around the country by virtue of vertical stare decisis.
History suggests one possible solution to this anomaly. In Ex parte
Young, the Supreme Court held that a lower federal court could enjoin a
state official acting in violation of the federal Constitution.407 Congress
responded with a law providing that such an injunction could only issue
from a three-judge panel.408 This law was driven by resistance to
allowing, in the words of one of the law’s proponents, “one little judge”
to halt the policy of a “whole State.”409 Congress expanded the threejudge procedure to suits seeking to enjoin federal laws in 1937, amidst the
furor over injunctions against New Deal initiatives.410 As Justice
Frankfurter explained, these laws “sought to assure more weight and
greater deliberation by not leaving the fate of such litigation to a single
judge.”411
That goal seems especially apt for nationwide injunctions. One way to
achieve it would be through legislation.412 But there would be significant
complications around defining the class of cases that should be channeled
to three-judge courts and serious inefficiencies around managing the
litigation beyond just the entry of the problematic relief.413 A simpler and
more targeted solution would be to require the concurrence of more than
one judge for a nationwide injunction without establishing a new court.
This could be achieved through circuit precedent, local rule, or a change
to internal operating procedures. It would work like this: any district court
injunction against a federal policy whose benefit extends beyond the
407

209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 159–60 (1908).
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District
Court, 70 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 101, 111–18 (2008).
409
45 Cong. Rec. 7256 (1910) (statement of Sen. Lee Overman).
410
Solimine, supra note 408, at 124–25.
411
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941). Congress mostly repealed the threejudge court requirement in 1976, though it retained such courts for a few categories of cases,
like redistricting cases. Solimine, supra note 408, at 148–50.
412
See Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, Harv. L. Rev.
Blog (Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwideinjunction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/82AV-MLGH].
413
Cf. David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3, 78 (1964) (noting similar complications in the old three-judge court regime).
408
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plaintiffs to the dispute would be automatically stayed (except as to the
parties) when the government files a motion to stay in the applicable court
of appeals. The full injunction would only go into effect if the court of
appeals panel denies the stay motion.414 That would mean that no
nationwide injunction could issue without the concurrence of two circuit
judges—an improvement on the current system and a salutary use of
judicial structure to safeguard a measure of minimalism.
2. Case-Assignment Rules
Our current system for assigning cases, though mostly randomized, is
an obscure hodge-podge and is sometimes taken advantage of by litigants
in a way that harms minimalist outcomes. There are two culprits. The first
is divisional judge assignment. District courts have wide latitude to
determine their case-assignment rules.415 More than half of the ninetyfour judicial districts are broken up into “divisions” that are used for caseassignment purposes.416 And at least eighty-one divisions in thirty judicial
districts have only one or two judges.417 That means litigants who file
complaints in those divisions will either know exactly what judge will be
assigned to the case or which of two judges will be randomly assigned.418
In one instance, the State of Texas chose to file a challenge to President
Obama’s deferred action immigration programs in Brownsville, Texas,
where it had a fifty percent chance of drawing a judge who had “harshly
criticized” the government’s leniency in immigration matters before.419
Texas in fact drew that judge, who entered a nationwide injunction.420 In
another instance, Texas filed a suit in Wichita Falls, Texas, challenging
414
Another possibility would be for district courts themselves to convene “en banc” panels.
This procedure is explored in Maggie Gardner, District Court En Bancs, 90 Fordham L. Rev.
1541 (2022).
415
See 28 U.S.C. § 137(a).
416
Botoman, supra note 217, at 299.
417
Id. at 319. These numbers come from 2018.
418
Id.
419
Id. at 298; see Alicia A. Caldwell, Judge: US Government Assisting Child Smuggling,
Associated Press (Dec. 19, 2013) (on file with editors), https://apnews.com/article/8b6a3958
63f348c2b1d2cc47ed563a67 (“A federal judge in Texas said in a recent order that the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security is assisting in criminal conspiracies to smuggle children
into the country when it helps reunite them with parents who are known to be in the U.S.
illegally.”).
420
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604, 671–72, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d,
809 F. 3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(mem.).
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the Obama Administration’s guidance that schools receiving federal
funds must allow students to use bathrooms consistent with their gender
identities.421 All cases filed in that division were assigned to a judge who
had recently ruled against the Obama Administration by holding that
“spouse” in the Family and Medical Leave Act could not include samesex spouses.422 That judge then issued a nationwide injunction against the
Obama Administration’s new policy.423
The second culprit is “related case” rules. When a complaint is filed, a
plaintiff can indicate on the civil cover sheet that the case is “related” to
an earlier-filed case, and the clerk will generally assign the case to the
judge handling the earlier case.424 Only about half of judicial districts even
have rules governing related cases, and the rules that do exist are
“characterized by two features: heterogeneity among districts and vague
standards that leave significant discretion to the decision-maker.”425 That
silence, vagueness, and heterogeneity invite “gamesmanship.”426 For
instance, Texas’s most recent challenge to the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) was steered to a particular judge by noting two prior putatively
“related” cases.427 As far as I can discern, there was no overlap of
substantive issues between the two cases other than that they both
involved the ACA.428 The judge then startled the legal world by declaring

421

Botoman, supra note 217, at 304.
Id. at 305 (citing Texas v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 3d 965, 980–81 (N.D. Tex. 2015)).
423
Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 828–34, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (“It cannot
be disputed that the plain meaning of the term sex . . . meant the biological and anatomical
differences between male and female students as determined at their birth.”); Texas v. United
States, No. 7:16-CV-00054-O, 2016 WL 7852331, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016) (“A
nationwide injunction is necessary because the alleged violation extends nationwide.”).
424
For a thorough overview of related case rules, see Marcel Kahan & Troy A. McKenzie,
Judge Shopping, 13 J. Legal Analysis 341 (2021).
425
Id. at 347.
426
Id. at 341.
427
See Civil Cover Sheet at 1, 4, Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (No. 4:18-cv-00167), ECF No. 1-1.
428
One of the two “related” cases was Texas v. Rettig, which involved a complicated set of
challenges to the method of computing Medicaid reimbursements under the ACA. 987 F.3d
518, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2021). In a strange twist, the other “related” case was a challenge to a
regulation issued under the ACA prohibiting discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or
gender identity in the provision of medical care. See Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 843 F.
App’x 662 (5th Cir. 2021). That case had been steered to the same judge by listing it as
“related” to the transgender student case discussed supra note 423. See Plaintiffs’ Notice of
Related Case, Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (No.
7:16-cv-00108), ECF No. 1-3, at 2.
422
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the ACA invalid in its entirety.429 The recent invalidation of the deferred
action programs likewise ended up in the same court that had previously
enjoined the programs due to related case rules.430
These case assignment rules can serve some valid purposes. The
Western District of Texas spans El Paso to Waco; one can appreciate that
an individual should not have to drive nine hours to attend a hearing in a
routine tort suit filed in diversity.431 A judge who has invested a lot of
time learning the technology underlying a patent should perhaps be
assigned a new infringement suit involving that same patent. But to allow
interested parties to take advantage of case-assignment rules to direct
cases to their preferred judges in major public law cases strikes me as
indefensible. Lower court judges wield far too much power for that kind
of strategic manipulation. It undermines public confidence in the judiciary
and sows cynicism about judicial outcomes.432 It offends basic notions of
fairness.433 And it has another critical effect, more relevant for my
purposes here: it systematically skews lower courts away from minimalist
outcomes. A plaintiff with any choice in the matter will pick a judge that
will rule for her on broad grounds, that will not hesitate to strike down a
law or policy, and that will not shrink from entering nationwide relief. To
the extent case assignment rules allow choice, it will tilt the system away
from minimalism.
This problem could be easily mitigated. Cases challenging the validity
of federal or state laws or policies should be exempt from normal case-

429

Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585, 619 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, 945 F.3d 355, 403 (5th Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom. California v. Texas,
141 S. Ct. 2104, 2120 (2021).
430
See Texas v. United States, No. 1:18-CV-00068, 2021 WL 3022434 (S.D. Tex. July 16,
2021); Civil Cover Sheet at 1, id., ECF Doc. 1-1. For a discussion of the court’s earlier decision
enjoining the programs, see supra note 420 and accompanying text. Again, I do not mean to
imply that these case-assignment rules uniquely benefit conservative causes. There have been
controversies involving “related case” designations with different political configurations.
See, e.g., Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the
Southern District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19
Mich. J. Race & L. 199, 204–05 (2014).
431
See 28 U.S.C. § 124(d).
432
Botoman, supra note 217, at 321–24.
433
Id. at 321–22. One might reasonably ask why even random case assignment is
normatively acceptable given that our legal culture generally abhors the idea of deciding cases
by a coin flip. For a defense of randomization, see Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in
Adjudication, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2009).
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assignment rules and be assigned randomly on a district-wide basis.434
These cases could be defined in terms of subject matter or parties and
relief sought. Defendants should have an opportunity to contest a related
case designation or divisional assignment.435 This change can be achieved
through local rules or by statute. And it would be a boon both to judicial
minimalism and public confidence in the judiciary.
3. The Size of the Lower Court Bench
Calls to add more federal district and circuit judges have proliferated
for decades. The basic reasons are apparent and sound. The size of the
bench has not kept pace with the growth in population and explosion in
the federal case load. Basic math and countless judges have testified to
the strain of this overload and how it damages the output of federal courts.
No new appellate judgeships have been created since 1990, and only
twenty-five new district judgeships have been added since 2000.436
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has heard fewer and fewer cases, putting
ever more emphasis on the lower courts as final arbiters of federal law.
The bottleneck has tightened as the bottle has swollen.437
Decisional minimalism supplies yet another reason for an already
needed reform. The caseload crisis has bifurcated the work of the courts
of appeals: the large majority of cases receive unpublished opinions, often
“subminimalist” dispositions drafted by staff attorneys.438 A select few
cases result in published opinions that create circuit precedent. This
bifurcation has converted courts of appeals into quasi-certiorari courts, a

434

Cf. Kahan & McKenzie, supra note 424, at 348 (noting that some districts have subjectmatter specific exceptions to related case rules).
435
I think that it would be good practice to appoint a case management committee of three
to five district judges who can oversee the assignment of cases and intervene if a judge retains
a case without good cause. See, e.g., D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 40.1(b). And the courts of appeals
should entertain mandamus petitions in cases where a district court abuses its discretion in
keeping a case. Cf. In re Flynn, 973 F.3d 74, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (noting that
mandamus is available to reassign a case “because the injury suffered by a party required to
complete judicial proceedings overseen by a disqualified judicial officer is by its nature
irreparable” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
436
Menell & Vacca, supra note 155, at 842.
437
Others have called on expanding the size of the bench to restore partisan balance to the
judiciary or to retaliate against hardball tactics in the Senate. See, e.g., Leah Litman, Expand
the Lower Courts, in How to Fix the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/expand-federal-courts-judges.html
[https://perma.cc/VAY9-F258].
438
See supra notes 167–72, 182, 184 and accompanying text.
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role for which they are not suited. It undermines decisional minimalism
by inducing judges to widen and deepen the few opinions that are
published. And that, in turn, means even less time for the rest of the
docket. When Taft urged Congress to expand the Supreme Court’s
certiorari jurisdiction, the premise of his argument was that a litigant is
entitled to an appeal in the intermediate courts of appeals.439 That policy
is embodied in our jurisdictional statutes. But it has been hollowed out by
exploding caseloads and a bench that has not kept pace. Increasing the
number of judgeships can begin to restore that policy, distribute judicial
resources more equitably, and lessen the inducements toward
“maximalism” in published opinions.440
CONCLUSION
Judicial minimalism arose and has been defended as a theory about
how Supreme Court Justices should judge. That is understandable: the
Court is an alluring and powerful institution, and the literature on
minimalism is just one instance of a broader bias in public law. But that
focus on the Supreme Court overlooks vast, submerged continents of the
American legal experience. I have tried to shine a light on judicial
minimalism in the lower courts and to show that the case for minimalism
is stronger there than in the Supreme Court. At the same time,
appreciating the full institutional context of the judiciary lessens the
appeal of decisional minimalism as a general approach for the Supreme
Court.
The deeper ambition of this Article is to stimulate further thinking
about how lower courts should exercise the judicial power. The
“decentralized character” of judicial review—the fact that any judge, high

439

Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court, supra note
150 (indicating that a litigant is “entitled” to appellate review in the intermediate circuit
courts); see Post, supra note 291, at 70.
440
The expansion could be made more politically feasible by introducing it in phases or by
having it take effect several years in the future. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 155, at 879–
80. Expanding the number of district judges could benefit decisional minimalism too, though
for a different reason. Broad rules are generally easier and less resource-intensive to apply
than narrow rules or more fact-sensitive standards. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 63 (1992). As a result, if district judges
are starved for time and resources, appellate courts may feel compelled to fashion broader
rules that are easier for district judges to apply. See generally Andrew Coan, Rationing the
Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making (2019)
(exploring how limits on judicial resources influence rules of substantive law).
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or low, has the power to enjoin a law or executive policy—is a
distinguishing feature of the American legal system.441 We tend to take
decentralization as the necessary entailment of Marbury’s holding that the
Constitution is ordinary—that is to say, justiciable—law.442 But a glance
around the world shows that to be untrue. “The United States is virtually
unique in having . . . a system in which ordinary judges can review and
strike down legislation.”443 The very fact that American-style lower
courts are so rare in comparative terms should make them a special
concern of legal theory. And there is a real danger that our focus on the
Supreme Court or on an idealized judge shorn of institutional distinctness,
like Professor Ronald Dworkin’s Hercules,444 could lead lower court
judges off the rails by erecting inapt, even counterproductive, models.
After all, it is hard to imagine that a hierarchical judiciary could properly
function if every judge, high and low, aspired to be Hercules. Perhaps a
great lower judiciary is made up of judges who aspire not to be great, but
merely good.

441
See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J.
1363, 1375–76 (1973).
442
See id. at 1376; Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58
Calif. L. Rev. 1017, 1043 (1970).
443
John E. Ferejohn, Constitutional Review in the Global Context, 6 N.Y.U. J. Legis. &
Pub. Pol’y 49, 49 (2002); see Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court:
Implications of the 1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 771, 772 (1993) (“[I]t is the integration of the so-called ‘inferior courts’ into
constitutional lawmaking that makes the United States’ system almost unique in the world.”).
Most constitutional democracies follow the European or “Kelsenian” model of investing the
power of constitutional review in a single, specialized court that is separate from the rest of
the judicial system. Ferejohn, supra, at 50–51; Greene, supra note 340, at 141. See generally
Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the
American Constitution, 4 J. Politics 183 (1942) (describing the specialized Constitutional
Court of Austria).
444
See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1083 (1975).

